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ABSTRACT

Epistemic Priors, Social Justice, and the Ethics of Humor
by
Paul Butterfield

Advisor: Noël Carroll

In this dissertation I set out a theory of humor ethics and, in particular, I establish what difference
humorousness makes to an instance of speech’s moral value. I set out by making the case for this
approach to the topic, demonstrating that focusing on how humorous speech differs, morally, from
non-humorous speech allows us to avoid getting caught up in prior ethical debates that are not
strictly about humor itself – a shortcoming that is common to many treatments of humor ethics in
the existing literature. I show that, in cases of humorous speech, we typically do not assert the
literal content of our speech, and that this is morally relevant, since it grants us the ethical liberty
to say things, as a joke, that it would be unacceptable to say seriously. I observe that instances of
humor generally play some incongruous element off against a context or occurrence that is
congruous, and that, as a result, we are able to say that an agent’s epistemic set will help to
determine what she finds funny, since our perceptions of what counts as congruous or incongruous
rely upon what we really believe and expect. This sets up the possibility of a relationship between
believing, e.g., racist things and being amused by certain jokes.
iv

I then make the case that humor can be the site of agreement and fraternity between agents
with unacceptable epistemic positions. Jokes can manifest, e.g., racism when a joke-teller intends
for her joke to have special appeal to audiences with racist beliefs, or when there is uptake, on the
part of the joke’s audience, based on just such an appeal. I distinguish between cases in which a
joker means for her joke to manifest condemnable epistemic items, and cases in which she
manifests those items while intending merely to amuse her audience. Cases in which a joker
deliberately expresses some unacceptable sentiment are straightforward cases of morally bad
behavior, which do not require any special, humor-specific observations to be accounted for. In
cases in which a joke manifests bigotry without its teller so intending, I identify the potential
wrongdoing as involving callousness. A joke-teller may not intend to communicate any offensive
idea through her humorous speech, but she can nevertheless demonstrate that she cares too little
for the reputation of her joke’s target if, for the sake of getting a laugh, she is willing to bear a
sufficiently likely risk that her audience will internalize a disrespectful message about them as a
result of hearing it.
In the final two chapters of the dissertation, I add to my theory by noting two important ethical
quirks of humor. The first of these is that one’s social identity is of greater moral relevance, when
one is speaking humorously, than when one is speaking non-humorously. I make the case for the
existence of this discrepancy, and explain it in terms of our social identity being a useful contextual
clue as to our intentions and beliefs, which can help settle ambiguity about what we are really
saying via our humorous speech acts. When we speak non-jokingly, no such ambiguity obtains,
and, as a result, the contextual clue of social identity does less ethical work. In the final chapter I
investigate the relationship between humorous communication and hermeneutical injustice, and
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propose the existence of comedic hermeneutical injustice as a distinct form of hermeneutical
injustice.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation explores the ethics of humorous speech. It concerns, then, questions such as: Who
gets to enjoy the moral liberty of telling a joke that targets whom? What counts as a racist or sexist
joke? Are there features whose presence in, or absence from, an instance of humor can reliably
inform us about whether we are right to be upset by it? And if I am personally offended by some
joke, what moral censure can I justifiably issue to the joke-teller without mischaracterizing the
nature of their speech?
I take it that these questions make sense, and, furthermore, that some version of one or all of
them has occurred to most of us at some point. It is a perfectly unremarkable occurrence to wonder
about the ethical value of some joke, specifically in its capacity as a joke. To think, then, not just
whether what some person said was permissible, but whether her joke was permissible – where
the term ‘joke’ is taken to be a relevant part of the question, such that it is possible for the answer
to have been different, if the word ‘claim’, ‘boast’ or ‘question’ had been substituted. This is why,
when topical debate television programs address the acceptability of some controversial recent
routine by a prominent comedian, they mention the comedic context. It is also why anybody
bothers to respond to criticism of their speech by saying that they “were only joking”. If
humorousness was not a morally relevant consideration, such a response would be a pointless nonsequitur.
In personal experience, in fact, I have found that the most immediate and confounding moral
dilemmas in my life have involved uncertainty about the appropriateness of moral condemnation
in response to humorous talk. I have found that everyday cases in which one is prompted to think
1
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in terms of right and wrong, or permissible and impermissible, tend to be cases in which one
already has a ready-made take on the matter. I know that I have a low opinion of the family whom
I watch leave the remnants of their picnic scattered around a clearing in a park and drive away,
and I know that there is wrongdoing present in a story I hear about a friend of a friend cheating on
her spouse. Likewise, there is nothing ambiguous about the praiseworthiness of a colleague who
volunteers at a local soup kitchen, or the relative who dedicates a weekend to helping you move
apartments. And, on the other hand, when one is presented with examples that involve genuine
ethical conflict – the administration of medical triage in wartime; the authorization of the use of
coercive force on noncompliant criminals; trolley problems – the relevant decisions tend to fall
upon people much more important than me, or upon nobody at all, because they are hypothetical.
When, in an undergraduate moral philosophy class, I sought instances of ethical ambiguity from
my actual life, the only cases immediately forthcoming involved me or someone else saying
something that sounded terrible, but playfully. If some statement S is homophobic when made
seriously, what is it when it’s a joke? If I insult you to your face, and only later you realize that I
was trying to be funny, to what extent should this realization moderate how offended you are?
I assumed that the same dilemmas would have occurred to others, and that, accordingly, there
would be a long-established canon of moral philosophy dedicated to questions regarding humorous
communication. This turned out not quite to be the case: when I looked for relevant material, I
found only a handful of works that were interested in the question of when a joke is ethically
acceptable; and, of those pieces, several took a skeptical view of the possibility of ever being able
to theoretically ground any moral claims about comedy at all. In his book Jokes, for example, Ted
Cohen considers the possibility of moral condemnation of jokes – but he advises his readers to
think of any such claims merely in terms of personal distaste. Calling to mind a joke that paints a
2
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particularly nasty caricature of black men, Cohen writes: “If I were to offer some resounding moral
condemnation of this joke, no doubt I would have to invoke some “moral theory,” and then show
that an implication of the theory is that this joke is Bad…I think [this] can’t be done” (1998, 81).
With no such theory forthcoming, Cohen makes the following suggestion: “When you feel strongly
that some joke…is no damned good, and especially when you don’t like having that joke told, and
it seems to you that the thing – either itself or the telling of it – is morally defective, hold on to that
feeling, and continue to express the feeling in terms of moral condemnation”. But, he advises,
“don’t imagine that your dislike must be grounded in some stupefying Moral Theory” (82-83).
I believe the fact that questions about the acceptability of instances of joke speech are
commonplace gives moral philosophers a good reason to address humor as a topic, and I consider
the views of those who, like Cohen, think it is impossible to offer principled reasons for being
upset by a joke too pessimistic. We can philosophize about ethical issues involving humor, and,
indeed, we ought to. My dissertation pushes the state of the art of humor ethics forward, by
showing what a bespoke ethics of humor should look like, detailing the features of humor that
allow us to link it to morally good or bad attitudes and predispositions, demonstrating the signs of
ethically permissible and impermissible instances of humor, and considering otherwise unexplored
moral implications of the ways that humans create and enjoy comedy.

Chapter One: Focusing on the Gap
In Chapter One of this dissertation, I review a spectrum of philosophical responses to questions of
ethics in humor. I find some common deficiencies in many of these works, and those shortcomings
inform the desiderata I come up with, ultimately, for any acceptable theory of humor ethics.
3
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A major issue with the pre-existing literature on humor ethics is that ethicists have frequently
treated humor, implicitly, as if it does not present any interesting normative puzzles in its own
right. Papers making claims about the moral implications of joke speech have appealed to features
of it – like the ability to offend, or the potential for a speaker to have malicious intentions – that
are not unique to humor and, instead, can be found in examples of all forms of speech, or all forms
of behavior. In chapter One, I cite a number of examples in which the claims made by philosophers
about joking ethics could be made to be about ethics more generally, without thereby altering the
philosophical work being done. I go on to explain the problem with this approach to the topic:
namely, that it ignores the fact that humor is morally unusual and that, because of this, it has no
prospect of answering pressing questions about humor ethics, since it cannot acknowledge the
humor-specific concerns that motivate interest in the topic. Sometimes it is acceptable to say, as a
joke, something that it would be completely impermissible to say sincerely. This fact is at the heart
of all genuinely interesting inquiry into the ethics of humor, and it is why, when we describe
scenarios whose permissibility we are curious about, we sometimes say “she told a joke about
Topic T” rather than simply saying “she talked about Topic T”. If we do not acknowledge that the
ethical value of speech can be altered by the fact that it is humorous, we will be unable to say
anything practically useful about the rights and wrongs of humorous speech – instead, we will be
bogged down in a thousand prior debates that recur in the discourse surrounding ethics of speech,
and ethics in general. Writing that focuses, instead, on how humorous speech diverges from other
speech in morally relevant ways, will have a better chance of saying something worthwhile about
jokes themselves. For this reason, I advocate for an approach that involves mapping the
idiosyncrasies of humor, and noting where (and why) the moral landscape of comic speech differs
from that of other kinds of behavior.
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I also note some flaws in the works of philosophers who succeed at treating humor as its own
thing, interestingly different from other ways of communicating or acting. In particular, I criticize
theories that hold that the moral value of a joke is roughly the same as the same statement, made
non-jokingly. (This is an importantly different sin from that of those previous theorists who fail to
acknowledge humor’s moral idiosyncrasies, since these writers are accepting the need to make
humor-specific normative claims, and are actively proposing - specifically about humor - that it
does not have any features that give us good reason to assess an agent’s behavior differently when
she engages in it.) I consider, for example, the work of Ronald De Sousa, and that of Niall Shanks
and Hugh LaFollette. De Sousa takes a hardline approach to jokes and comedy that play on
pejorative stereotypes or invoke antagonistic attitudes against members of particular social groups:
he claims that sharing or enjoying such instances of humor reveals that we really hold the negative
attitudes; really believe that the stereotypes in question are accurate (De Sousa 1987, 290). Shanks
and LaFollette end up making a similar claim, suggesting that jokes that belittle members of a
given social group could only be appreciated by audiences who really wish that group ill
(LaFollette and Shanks 1993, 337).
De Sousa’s position has been criticized by theorists who point out that it is possible merely to
entertain a negative attitude towards some group of people in order to find an antagonistic joke
about them funny; or, similarly, to recognize a stereotype as existing, rather than endorsing it as
true, in order to find a joke which makes reference to that stereotype amusing. I apply a similar
critique to LaFollette and Shanks’ view: there does not seem to be any good reason to believe that
a joke that belittles some social group will only be enjoyable to bigots – in fact, from what has
been written about the nature of humor thus far, there does not seem be any good reason to believe
that such a joke will be any more likely to be enjoyed by bigots than by right-thinking people. This
5
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is because, once again, it seems perfectly plausible for one to enjoy a joke that pokes fun at some
group simply because one recognizes some common trope about them that is being invoked, or
can imaginatively put oneself in the position of having an antagonistic attitude towards them, for
the sake of the laugh.

Chapter Two: Some Mechanisms of Humor
Chapter Two is concerned with metaphysical observations about the nature of comic speech. I note
some features that one tends to find in examples of humor, and some whose presence generally
correlates with an examples of humor being more funny – and these observations set up the ethical
claims that I will make about humorous speech in later chapters.
A useful place to begin, for a project that aims to map the moral idiosyncrasies of humor, is by
thinking about the nature of assertion. The most immediately striking morally-relevant difference
between humorous and non-humorous speech is that, when I am joking, I typically do not mean to
tell you anything about the world. Or, if I do mean to tell you something about the world, that
information will be communicated indirectly: my meaning will not be the same as what it would
have been, had I been speaking literally and sincerely. When I say, non-humorously, that your
behavior at the bar last night was insufferable, I am usually asserting that your behavior at the bar
last night was insufferable. When I joke that your behavior at the bar last night was insufferable, I
am likely not to be asserting anything at all; and if I am asserting anything, it is not that your
behavior was insufferable. 1

Such a statement, made humorously, could be adverting to the fact that you were actually perfectly wellbehaved, and that anyone of a different opinion is being stuck-up and intolerant. Perhaps you had a drink
in you and were speaking marginally louder than average conversational volume, leading a nearby patron

1
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Perhaps this observation sounds obvious. Perhaps it is obvious. But it does a lot for us, if our
goal is to investigate the moral whys and wherefores of joke speech. For example, it immediately
establishes a major way in which the content of our speech is altered by the fact that it is funny, or
intended to be funny; likewise, it gives us a reason to change our beliefs regarding what a speaker
was intending to do or say with their speech, when we discover that they had been joking. It also
offers justification, at least on some occasions, for a person using ‘I was only joking’ as a rejoinder
to moral criticism, since it accounts for why a flat-footed response to a joke (i.e. one in which the
responder takes the content of the speech at face value) will often be unfair to the joke-teller,
attaching sentiments to their speech that cannot reasonably be inferred.
But even if a joke is different from a straightforward assertion, the things that make us laugh
are not random. Being amused by an instance of humor is not the same thing as agreeing with a
spoken proposition, and it would be a mistake to draw any definite conclusions about what a person
believes on the basis of their enjoying one joke; and yet, jokes do play upon our views of the world.
The most prominent set of philosophical definitions of humor describe it as being based essentially
in a reaction to the perception of something incongruous (Hurley et al 2013, 45; and this is
observed in Morreall 2009, although Morreall does not endorse the incongruity theory). Thus, to
find something funny, one must perceive some occurrence that subverts or violates one’s
expectations; or that two ideas are being presented that are in some tension with each other; or that
an object or phenomenon has been placed in a category to which it does not belong. This theory
of humor allows us to posit a link of some sort between the things one finds funny and the things

to accuse you of ruining everyone in the establishment’s night. I could say “man, the way you acted last
night was criminal,” in order to humorously refer to the fact that you did nothing wrong and were
nevertheless upbraided for your unremarkable conduct. The statement in question could mean other
things, too, of course; but it could mean that.
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one believes sincerely, since what one finds congruous or incongruous will depend on one’s actual
worldview.
Later in the same chapter, I add a further observation about the nature of humor to the
incongruity-based account. I propose that instances of humor are generally funnier when, in the
build-up to their incongruous climax, they stipulate as few deviations as possible from the world
as their audience understands it; and when the punchline itself deviates from their audience’s
expectations as significantly as possible. A joke or comedy that, in its build-up, can allow its
audience to take its typical expectations of the world for granted will zip along to its punchline in
a pleasing manner; but, on the other hand, one that requires its teller to provide a laundry list of
stipulations before the punchline comes will seem contrived and overladen with exposition. Its
humorousness will suffer as a result. I strengthen this case with some examples from popular
comedy, pointing out that they work only because they do not require many flights of fancy on the
part of their audiences – or, for others that fall flat, that they do so because their set-ups ask their
audiences to deviate too far from their default assumptions.
By the end of Chapter Two, then, I have a basis from which to observe that jokes are linked to
beliefs about the world, enough for certain jokes to be more funny, all else being equal, to a person
with worldview V than to one with worldview W – in particular, those that stipulate fewer
deviations from V than W in their premises. And, since some worldviews are, for example, racist,
sexist, or misanthropic, this means that I have taken an important step to building a principled
ethics of humor, able to offer real guidance about when it is justifiable to consider a joke racist,
sexist, or misanthropic.
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Chapter Three: The Communication of Ideas Through Humor
In Chapter Three I spell out what the previously-established features of humor mean for the moral
value of different instances of comic speech, and I apply these observations to some real-world
cases. I first complete my explanation for how jokes can express the attitudes of their tellers,
including morally vicious attitudes: since jokes with (e.g.) racist premises can hold a special appeal
to (e.g.) racists on the basis of their particular mix of the congruous with the incongruous, a
prejudiced joker can deploy offensive humor in order to attract a like-minded audience, and in
order to build intimacy on the basis of the relevant prejudice. A homophobic person telling
homophobic jokes is expressing herself, however covertly – and she may also be attracting fellow
homophobes and finding common, comic, ground with them. This process does not need to be
apparent to the parties involved: wrongheaded agents can enjoy fellow-feeling with others through
humor, just as you and I can, when we share and enjoy the same kinds of jokes without any shared
commitment to offensive ideals.
Then I sketch the moral import of such a phenomenon taking place. Firstly, offensive jokes
being enjoyed by bigoted jokers together can help spread the associated prejudices. If one person
understand another as expressing their hateful views through their humorous speech, and if that
first person has enough trust in the judgement of the second, the jokes in question can be liable to
convince their audience of the truth of offensive propositions in much the same way as any other
form of testimony can. Gay jokes can thereby become a vector for non-humorous homophobia, et
cetera. Secondly, humorous speech having this ability is morally relevant insofar as it means that
jokes can reflect morally badly upon their tellers and audiences. If you have good reason to believe
that my jokes about women are not ‘merely jokes’, but instead reflective of genuine feelings of
misogyny on my part, you have learned something about me that redounds to my discredit.
9
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Applying these insights to real cases, I offer a disjunction between situations in which a joketeller desires to express something morally unacceptable, like an attitude of misogyny, and
situations in which she tells the same joke without any such intent. If I tell you an offensive joke
and, in so doing, I actively wish to express a genuinely-held antagonism towards, say, black people,
then the situation is not greatly distinguished, in moral terms, from one in which I express the same
sentiment without joking. I have said something racist, and meant something racist, and if my
speech act is successful, you will understand something racist as a result of having heard it. There
is work to be done by ethicists here – perhaps, for example, by ethicists interested in how racist
speech can spread racist ideas – but not much to be done by ethicists of humor. More interesting,
for the purposes of this work, are situations in which a person tells an offensive racial joke without
it being an expression of any sincere racist view on her part. If I share a joke that targets black
people on the basis of some unfair, negative stereotype, even though my opinions and attitudes
regarding race are innocent, this throws up more interesting quandaries for humor ethicists. In
particular, there is work to be done here in explaining how it is possible for an innocently-minded
joke-teller to be at fault, morally, for telling such a joke.
My answer to this challenge involves the notion of callousness. When an agent jokes in a way
that risks harm to the reputation of a person or social group, they hold some moral responsibility
for that risk, even in the absence of any intention, on their part, to harm or disrespect their target.
If the risk is sufficiently great, and the joke’s target sufficiently undeserving of scorn, then the
joker can be at fault, morally, for her humorous speech. I give the example of Jimmy Carr, who
jokingly belittled the seriousness of the systematic murder of Romany Travelers during the
Holocaust. I take for granted that Carr has no actual malicious feeling about members of the
Traveling community, but point out that, given the size of his audience and the respect his fans
10
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have for him, it is very likely that some members of his audience will internalize a disrespectful
message about Romany people on the basis of hearing his joke. To be willing to take this risk for
the sake of causing comic amusement demonstrates callousness, insofar as it shows that Carr holds
the reputation of his joke’s targets in inappropriately low regard.

Chapter Four: Social Identity and the Ethics of Humor
In Chapter Four I offer an analysis of the moral importance of a person’s social identity to cases
of humor-sharing. It is often observed, in discussions regarding joke-telling, that whether one
belongs to the social group one is targeting with one’s humorous speech makes a significant
difference to the moral value of what one says. A joke centering on some pejorative stereotype
about black people might cause great offense in almost any instance in which it is told, except when
it is told by a black person – and, when it is told by a black person, it may be entirely innocuous. I
get to grips with exactly how strong this dependance of ethics upon social identity is, and find
reason to believe that social identity plays a larger role in determining the moral value of jokes
than of non-humorous speech. Belonging to the social group about which one is speaking
negatively provides one with a more substantial moral excuse when the pejorative speech is a joke,
than when it is serious.
I explain why this should be the case, with reference to the fact that joke speech is typically
highly ambiguous, in the sense that it is not perfectly clear what the intentions of a speaker are
when she jokes. I may joke about Muslims because, say, I have relatively innocently found some
amusing observation that links two known stereotypes about Muslims; but I might also joke about
Muslims in part because I actually hold an antagonistic view of Islam and am attempting to express
11
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that view in conversation. Given this, there is an open question regarding the intentions of anyone
who tells a pejorative joke, that is not present in cases of non-humorous speech. To resolve these
ambiguities, one needs to appeal to contextual information: what other features of a speaker’s
personality, history, or speech would give us reason to believe in an innocent, or, alternately, a
malicious, explanation for her speech? Group membership is just such a clue. As a rule, people do
not have hateful views of the groups to which they belong: Jewish people tend not to be antiSemites, black people tend not to be white supremacists, and so on. It makes sense, then, for us to
give the ethical benefit of the doubt to any joker who belongs to the group she jokes about. By
contrast, there are few innocent explanations available for a person straightforwardly talking badly
of (for example) a race of people. The contextual clue of a speaker’s social identity cannot do so
much work for us, because there is little benefit of the doubt we could possibly give.

Chapter Five: Comedic Hermeneutical Injustice
The reliance of comic speech on starting from somewhere its audience perceives as ordinary, and
getting to a point at which it can present something highly unexpected, has morally relevant
upshots that go beyond those detailed in Chapter Three. The identity of the occurrences that any
given person perceives as congruous or incongruous will depend heavily on that person’s
background and lived experience. And since one’s culture and social identity play a significant
role in determining what one considers to be normal or abnormal, which instances of humor one
is primed to be amused by depends heavily on these factors. If you and I are of different
nationalities, ethnicities, ages, and genders, our experiences and perceptions of the world will
differ – and so, therefore, will our inclinations to find joke X or Y amusing.

12
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This is what makes social identity a relevant issue to the ethics of humor, and it is what makes
it possible for what I term ‘comedic hermeneutical injustice’ to occur. Comedic hermeneutical
injustice is the phenomenon by which a person fails to find uptake of their comic speech within
their audience, where that failure is caused to a significant degree by the presence of some
inequality between social groups. The marginalization of the experiences of members of some
groups, and the comparative ‘mainstreaming’ of the experiences of others, cause it to be the case
that some groups of people have lived experiences that are well-expressed and, accordingly, well
understood by others in their community. Members of certain other groups, on the other hand,
enjoy no such publicization of their experiences. As a result, it is predictable that agents falling
under the former descriptor will have a wealth of points of reference that are accessible to almost
everyone to whom they wish to tell jokes; and that agents of the latter sort will tend to have fewer
opportunities to display their wit to a wide audience. This is the essence of comedic hermeneutical
injustice, and in Chapter Five I detail the means by which we see this form of injustice occur, note
some of its idiosyncrasies relative to other forms of hermeneutical injustice, and assess how much
of a setback it is to one’s interests to experience its associated harms.

13

CHAPTER ONE – FOCUSING ON THE GAP

Humor Ethics and Comedy in Popular Culture
In 2015, a moral controversy erupted surrounding this joke, told by comedian Amy Schumer:
“I used to date Hispanic men, but now I prefer consensual.”
When this material emerged into the popular consciousness, it provoked think pieces in The
Washington Post and The Guardian, amongst others, giving moral criticism of the joke, and, by
extension, Schumer herself (see Patton and Leonard 2015; Heisey 2015). In defense of the gag,
Schumer tweeted:
“I am a comic. I am so glad more people are laughing at me and with me all of the sudden.
I will joke about things you like and I will joke about things you aren't comfortable with.
And that's ok. Stick with me and trust I am joking. I go in and out of playing an irreverent
idiot. That includes making dumb jokes involving race. I enjoy playing the girl who time to
time says the dumbest thing possible and playing with race is a thing we are not supposed
to do, which makes it so fun for comics. You can call it a 'blind spot for racism' or 'lazy'
but you are wrong. It is a joke and it is funny. I know that because people laugh at it.”
On the other side of the debate lies the (previously cited) article written by Stacey Patton and
David J. Leonard, in which the authors directly cite this particular joke as part of a body of evidence
that Schumer is racist, or, at least, that she frequently says racist things. Patton and Leonard write:
“Just as Rush Limbaugh, Donald Trump and other members of the Republican Party
regularly disparage people of color and claim they are simply telling the truth, Schumer
14
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can use comedy as a protective shroud to deny the harm and hurt caused by her jokes…
[But] blind or not, joking or not, Schumer used her stage to play and profit off race while
people of color are bearing the brunt of racial violence.
While black families are burying their dead, churches are burning, black women church
pastors are receiving death threats and the KKK is planning rallies in South Carolina,
Schumer is “playing” with race. While Latinos are being deported in record numbers,
while “80 percent of Central American girls and women crossing Mexico en route to the
United States are raped,” while children are languishing in camps in the Southwest,
Schumer has got jokes, and only white America is laughing.” (Patton and Leonard 2015)
Similar controversies concern the material of the comedian Frankie Boyle. Boyle has been the
subject of British cultural moral rancor on a number of occasions, including in the wake of a joke
he told about glamor model Katie Price and her son, who is disabled. The British press united to
call the joke – and Boyle – ‘vile’, and criticize the broadcaster of Boyle’s TV show Tramadol
Nights for allowing it to air (see Brown 2011). Following the controversy, Boyle followed a joke
on his next stand-up comedy tour with this disclaimer:
“l’m going to build this up so it’s so ridiculous and so fucking cartoonish, that people can
tell it’s a joke and l couldn’t possibly mean it. [Otherwise I will] start to get a Down’s
syndrome picket line, a learning-disabled army of the damned, turning up outside my shows
on the wrong night. Stopping the Chuckle Brothers from getting to do their fucking gig. l
just think we do have people in this country now, who are just a bit fucking humorless and
they just don’t know when you’re joking. “ls he joking, this comedian? ls this comedian
joking up on the comedy stage, at this comedy festival, do you think he’s fucking joking?”
I’m joking, you stupid fucking cunts. You can’t take everything seriously.”
15
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The disagreements between Schumer and Boyle, on the one hand, and their respective critics,
on the other, are representative of non-academic debates centered around the permissibility of
particular instances of humor more generally. Those who see bad behavior in a certain joke might
find it tasteless, poorly-timed, or bigoted. They may think it rises to the status of bullying or hate
speech. Chastised jokers may accept claims of wrongdoing and repent fully; or they may regret
the content of their jokes to some extent, but think the critical response has been overblown; or, as
happens quite often, they may see no wrongdoing in their jokes whatsoever, and may be sincerely
bemused by the fact that anybody saw fit to object to them.

Focusing on the Gap
I want to make two observations about the kind of debates mentioned in the previous section.
Firstly: humor ethics, as a subject, will have missed a trick if it is unable to engage in any
meaningful way with these discussions. An academic investigation of the moral rights and wrongs
of comic communication does not amount to much, if it has nothing useful to offer agents in the
world who are actually in the process of disagreeing about the rights and wrongs of comic
communication.
Second: in these disagreements, it is typically taken to be ethically material that what is under
discussion is humor. Schumer and Boyle each point to the humorousness of their speech as a
crucial reason for its acceptability: accusations of racism and cruelty have missed the mark,
according to the comedians, because they have been applied to instances of humor. 2 These
‘Humorousness’ is popularly used to mean ‘the state of attribute of being funny’. In this dissertation,
however, I also use the word to mean ‘the state or attribute of being an instance of humor’. This usage
lacks the implication of success: a stand-up comedy routine will, under the latter definition, be
‘humorous’ even if it amuses no-one.

2
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accusations might have been appropriate if either comic had said what they said sincerely, but,
since their speech was joke speech, the critics are being unacceptably harsh. Likewise, in everyday
contexts, one hears appeals that an agent was ‘only joking’ – that her utterance was ‘just a joke’ –
primarily because this is taken to be a good reason for us to revise our condemnation of her down,
or to abandon it completely. Even critics of humorists are likely to admit that humorous talk is
sometimes ethically distinct from non-humorous talk: hence we hear statements like “you
shouldn’t say that, even as a joke,” or “I enjoy a laugh, but that went too far”. The way in which
these discussions proceed, then, implies that humor has some morally relevant idiosyncrasies when
compared with other styles of communication or genres of entertainment. In the everyday context,
when we ask, “was that joke [morally] okay?” we are, in part, asking, “does the fact that what was
just said was a joke change whether or not it was [morally] okay?”
Indeed, it is only the possibility that saying something humorously diverges, morally, from
saying it non-humorously that makes it worth generating an ethics of humor in the first place. If
the answers to moral questions about humor simply fell out of the answers to questions about
speech ethics more broadly, moral philosophers could certainly write about joke-telling as a way
of adding color to intuition pumps, or because of a desire to be completionists while describing
the rules that govern human interaction; but there would be no need for novel theoretical
investigation there. The morality of humor qua humor is only of interest because the fact that
someone is joking, rather than being sincere, is often a fact that affects the moral value of her
actions.
Because of these facts, I propose that humor ethicists ought to analyze humor within a
comparative framework, in which we accept our audiences’ assumptions about what is offensive
or immoral to say seriously as the baseline, and then simply consider when and why the morality
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of humor might vary from this standard. Instead of asking: “is this joke morally bad, compared to
not doing anything?” we should ask: “is this joke morally bad, compared to saying the same thing,
but not as a joke?” Pursuing humor ethics in this way will allow us to make points that get to the
heart of what is morally interesting about humor itself, and prevent us from getting bogged down
in prior applied ethical questions regarding all speech, or all behavior; or in normative ethical
questions about what counts, in principle, as morally permissible or –objectionable. In short: there
is a moral gap between serious speech and humor, and we, as humor ethicists, should focus upon
that gap. 3

The Current State of Humor Ethics Literature
A number of philosophers have noticed that the morality of humor is an interesting and worthwhile
topic – but humor ethicists have, largely, neglected the existence of the moral gap to which I refer.
Instead of mapping the ways in which humor is morally idiosyncratic, compared to non-humorous
speech, they have typically made claims about the ethics of speech simpliciter, and noted that these

The effect that humorousness has on moral value, when it has any such effect, is, I think, typically an
exculpatory one: one says something that would be terrible, if one was speaking seriously; but one is
joking, so one’s speech act is acceptable, or anyway less morally troubling. But there are reasons to think
that certain pieces of humorous speech, in certain circumstances, can in fact be worse than an equivalent
piece of non-humorous speech. Evidence from social psychology suggests that sexist jokes can prime us
to be tolerant of sexist behavior with greater effectiveness than straightforward sexist speech, since they
encourage hearers to approach sexism with a light-hearted attitude (see Thomas Ford, “Effects of sexist
humor on tolerance of sexist events,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 26 (2000); Thomas
Ford, Wentzel, E. R. Wentzel, and J. Lorien, “Effects of exposure to sexist humor on perceptions of
normative tolerance of sexism,” European Journal of Social Psychology 31 (2001); Thomas Ford and
Mark Ferguson, “Social Consequences of Disparagement Humor,” Personality and Social Psychology
Review 8 (2004); Julie A. Woodzicka and Thomas Ford, “A framework for thinking about the (not-sofunny) effects of sexist humor,” Europe's Journal of Psychology 3 (2010)); and sometimes the fact that
one springs for humorous speech at all indicates an inappropriate attitude to the situation at hand (see
Merrie Bergmann, “How Many Feminists Does It Take To Make A Joke,” Hypatia 1 (1986): 78-79).

3
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observations apply to humor; or they have made claims that are ostensibly about humor, but in fact
generalize, without modification, to speech more widely.
In ‘Prejudice in Jest: When Racial and Gender Humor Harms’, David Benatar proposes that a
joke is morally bad “where it is intended to harm people or where there are good grounds for
expecting it to harm people, and where the harm in question is wrongfully inflicted” (Benatar 1999,
191). In proposing this harm-based account of morality in humor, Benatar follows Michael Philips,
who also took harmful effects on a target to be essential to a joke’s being morally bad. For his part,
Philips was interested mainly in what makes a joke racist, but he took his arguments to apply just
as well to other moral flaws instances of humor might display (Philips 1984, 76). He terms his
account of racist humor the ‘act-centered account’, and promotes it against the ‘agent-centered
account’, according to which a joke is only racist if its teller speaks with racist intentions. The
agent-centered account has some popularity in everyday life, where agents accused of racist joking
are apt to respond that they ‘don’t have a racist bone in their body’, or intended no racist message
through their humor. But Philips points out the limitations of applying this definition of ‘racist’ to
real-world cases: it lets off the hook too easily those who, for example, deliberately exclude black
people from a social event not because they hold directly racist views, but in order to avoid
awkwardness with friends who do (1984, 82). It is also conceivable, under this view, for
paradigmatically racist phenomena to take place in the absence of racism on the part of any
individual: “Suppose that all the German soldiers at Dachau acted out of patriotism and all the
Klansmen at the lynching were there for business reasons. Would this mean that none of those who
participated in such events were guilty of racist acts?” (Philips 1984, 81) Where Benatar’s view
differs from Philips’ is that Benatar believes one can be harmed by things that stop short of being
‘acts’: he thinks we have a standing interest in being held in high regard, and when, for example,
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agents consider us to be less than fully human because we belong to a racial group they despise,
this can constitute a harm even if they do not act upon their belief (Benatar 1999, 192-193).
However, act-centered views of humor ethics, whether they fall upon Philips’ or Benatar’s side
of the debate regarding the question of disrespect-as-harm, have themselves been criticized for
failing to capture crucial cases. In his 2015 paper ‘Racist Humor’, Luvell Anderson points out the
flaws of both act-centered and agent-centered views of racism, as they apply to humor. 4 Anderson
finds the act-centered view insufficient for capturing every case of racist humor, because a joke
told by a racist, to another racist, on a desert island of racists who are isolated from any member
of the targeted ethnic groups that they could otherwise harm could not count as racist on this
account (2015, 503). Anderson focuses his criticism of the agent-centered view, on the other hand,
on the work of Jose Garcia. Garcia’s view – which makes the racism of an act depend upon the
racist motivations of its teller – is dismissed because it rules out the possibility of unintentionally
racist humor, shared by well-meaning but ignorant joke-tellers (see Garcia 1996, cited in Anderson
2015, 505). The shortcomings of these views lead Anderson to expand the categories of race-based
humor, to include not just ‘racist’ and ‘merely racial’, but also an intermediate category of ‘racially
insensitive’ (2015, 506).
But telling a racist (or racially insensitive) joke is, of course, not the only way that one could
conceivably act badly while engaged in the sharing of humor. In her article ‘Just Joking: The Ethics
of Humor’, Robin Tapley attempts to explain not what makes a joke racist, but instead what
constitutes grounds for considering an instance of humor morally upsetting more generally. She
concludes that humor is morally objectionable just when it features ‘social harm’ and ‘social

Once again, we can apply the caveat that, while the debate in question centers around racism, the
arguments Anderson gives have analogs for immorality of other kinds in humor.
4
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disparity’ (2005, 180). That is to say: a joke is bad iff it is told by a person from a socially dominant
social group, and intentionally degrades members of a socially subordinated group. Tapley defends
the requirement for the joke-teller to possess some social privilege, and the target to be socially
marginalized in some way, with reference to the fact that privileged and well-represented groups
have a comparatively influential voice within their community, and subordinated groups are
relatively powerless (183). Thus: a privileged joke-teller is in a good position to influence her
audience’s opinion of her target; and a marginalized group is unlikely to get much of a chance to
prove, say, an unflattering stereotype incorrect.
Now: I certainly accept that much of what precedes is of value to moral philosophy. Notice,
however, that, in an important sense, it all actually has very little to do with humor. If you were to
substitute the terms ‘jokes’ or ‘humor’ for the terms ‘speech’ or ‘acts’ in these works, nothing
about their philosophical arguments would be changed. Nothing important in Anderson’s writing
depends on jokes being part of his discussion: an argument that was identical, except that it was
concerned with racist acts rather than racist humor, would work in precisely the same way. It
would cite the example of a group of racists on a desert island, engaged in generic racist behavior,
in order to show that a consequence-based definition of racist behavior is flawed. It would note
the possibility of an agent doing something racist in general as a result of ignorance, by way of
explaining the problem with intention-based accounts. And it would introduce the concept of racial
insensitivity, rather than outright racism, as a tool for explaining what goes wrong in certain
interactions between members of different racial groups, whether those interactions are humorous
or not. Likewise, Philips’ criticism of agent-centered views goes through regardless of whether it
is being applied to humorous speech, and when Benatar diverges from him on the topic of whether
disrespect and degradation can constitute a harm, what is at issue is disrespect and degradation
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generally – not any special kind of disrespect and degradation that can arise from joke-telling in
particular. Finally, Tapley’s work makes reference to unequal distributions of social power that
affect all forms of communication, and probably every act a person might perform while belonging
to a social community.
Intentionally or inadvertently, then, these philosophers have given arguments not about humor,
but about morality in the abstract; humor is present in their examples, but the real philosophy is
happening elsewhere. Ethicists writing about humor are correct to think that it is a subject worthy
of their scrutiny – but, by failing to describe or account for anything morally unusual about humor,
relative to other forms of speech or behavior, they have ended up writing about it as if it is not.
Focusing on the moral gap between humorous and non-humorous speech allows us to offer an
ethics of humor that is actually about humor.

A Defense of the Idea That Humor Is Interestingly Morally Idiosyncratic
Of course, studying the moral gap between humorous and non-humorous speech would not take
very long, or contribute very much, if it turned out that a) the everyday discussions that treat
humorousness as ethically material are simply mistaken, because instances of humor are never
morally distinct from their non-humorous counterparts, or b) the gap simply consists in the fact
that no instance of humor is ever morally bad. Thus, in this section I will make the case that neither
of these scenarios obtain, and that, accordingly, the moral idiosyncrasies of humor deserve serious
and prolonged consideration.
Consider Amy Schumer’s joke about Hispanic men. You might well believe that the fact that
what she said was a joke does not excuse her speech – and if, in thinking so, you mean that it does
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not fully excuse – does not deflect all moral criticism away from her – you might be right. But if
you mean that it does not excuse at all – does not deflect any moral criticism – you are surely
wrong. There is simply no way that saying what she said, when one is joking, is as bad as saying
what she said if one were not joking. Consider this: imagine you knew Schumer personally, and
mentioned to her in conversation that you were dating someone new. As the conversation went on,
you mentioned that the person you were dating was a Hispanic man, and Schumer responded: “Oh,
I wouldn’t do that if I were you. Hispanic guys are rapists.” That would be an appalling thing to
say. And, no matter what our standing opinion about the morality of Schumer’s joke is, nobody
can sincerely deny that this would be a worse thing to say, by virtue of its sincerity, than the joke
she actually made. So here’s the sense in which her tweet definitely did contain a moral excuse:
anyone who was previously of the mindset that Schumer was not joking when she said that
Hispanic men were rapists has, by hearing it, learned something that ought to make them think less
badly of her. She was joking – and the fact that she was joking makes her statement less bad than
it would otherwise have been.
At the same time, however, one can act morally badly when one jokes. This claim is modest,
and, to some of us, it may seem obviously true; but it is controversial. It is rejected implicitly by
the moral defenses given by Boyle and Schumer, cited at the opening of this chapter: Boyle’s
sarcastic send-up of the po-faced moralist, desperately trying to ascertain whether a comedian is
engaged in comedy, rests on the unspoken proposition that moral criticisms of speech are only
appropriate when aimed at that speech which is not comic; Schumer’s juxtaposition of her critics’
accusations of wrongdoing with the fact that her speech ‘is a joke’ only makes sense if we think
that the idea of doing something wrong and the idea of telling a joke are in tension. So, for the
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purposes of dealing with a view which has some popular assent, it is worthwhile motivating a
defense of the potential for any wrongdoing, whatsoever, in joke speech.
Jokes look a great deal too closely related to other forms of speech for them to be entirely
morally inert. Joke speech can express sentiment, seed ideas in its audience, and have the kinds of
illocutionary and perlocutionary effects identified by J. L. Austin (1962), such as warning someone
and thereby getting her to proceed with caution, or insulting someone and thereby causing her to
leave the room. Humor has these abilities in common with non-humor. Now, perhaps Schumer
and Boyle meant no harm; but some jokers do. One can conceive of a racist comedian who intends
to create an atmosphere within her society in which members of a particular ethnic minority are
marginalized and intimidated. This she achieves, through a series of well-told jokes that trade in
stereotypes of the group as, say, stupid, but deceitful. The popularity of her jokes encourages
members of the cultural ethnic majority to entertain the relevant stereotypes and, while nobody
believes the jokes to be literally true, they generally internalize some link between members of the
targeted racial group and stupidity or deceit. Perhaps they think that it is not the case that every
single member of the relevant group is a lie-telling moron, but they nevertheless believe that
stereotypes are usually based on truth and, accordingly, that there must be some tendency towards
the relevant attributes amongst the targets of the jokes, taken as a whole. Meanwhile, in being
aware of the newfound popularity of jokes mocking their perceived characteristics, members of
the ethnic minority in question tend to feel alienated and disrespected within a society in which
they previously felt at home. Ill-feeling and racial animus result, making our comedian’s campaign
of joke-telling, by her own measure, a great success.
If the comedian above set out to achieve, and succeeded in achieving, these results through
sincere speech, this would be an open-and-shut case of moral wrongdoing. Our comedian has
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morally bad intentions; her actions are indicative of a bad character; and in acting, she makes the
world a worse place. Thus, we can see that the skeptic about the possibility of moral wrongdoing
through humor is forced to suggest something bizarre: that this joker is innocent, and that, more
generally, the mere presence of joke-telling is some kind of magic bullet that will always make
what would otherwise be an obvious case of bad behavior morally inert. When the skeptical view
of humor ethics is gestured at, off-hand, without its implications being directly expressed – as was
the case with Boyle and Schumer – it can have the ring of a certain perceived wisdom; but few
would be happy to accept the eccentricities of such a view, once they are spelled out. Our
comedian’s successful campaign of race-baiting is morally wrong. It is also an example of humorsharing behavior. Thus, it is possible for humor-sharing behavior to be morally wrong. 5

Existent Humor Ethics That Does Not Neglect the Gap
Although much of what has been written about humor ethics is poorly attuned to the aspects of
humor that are unique in morally relevant ways, this is not true of all such writing. Philosophers
have, in places, addressed the topic while treating humor as a distinct and idiosyncratic
phenomenon. In the rest of this chapter, I attend to a number of theories that do not neglect the
gap, and assess how plausible they are in their own right, as well as noting cases that do not seem
to be well-explained by the theories in question. I conclude that while these views deserve praise
for not falling into the traps detailed thus far in this chapter, none of them represent a plausible
account of humor ethics.

Granted, this is an extreme case: most cases in which persons claim to be ‘only joking’ do not feature
such cartoonishly vicious behavior. But that’s okay, since at this juncture I only mean to foreclose on the
skeptical view that no humor is ever morally bad, and this example succeeds in that endeavor.

5
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One philosopher who seems actively to deny that there is a great deal about humor that is
ethically distinct is Ronald De Sousa. In his book chapter ‘When Is It Wrong to Laugh?’ De Sousa
offers a restrictive view of the permissibility of humorous speech. He writes that to make, or laugh
at, a joke which trades upon a negative stereotype or vicious assessment of a person or group
reveals that one really endorses the hateful attitude; believes the unflattering stereotype to be true.
He describes the joke work exhibited in something like a rape joke as ‘phthonic’ – that is, based
upon “malicious envy” – and insists that it could not be enjoyed ‘from the armchair’, as it were:
“to find [a rape joke] funny, the listener must actually share those sexist attitudes. In contrast to
the element of wit, the phthonic element in a joke requires endorsement. It does not allow of
hypothetical laughter” (1987, 289, 290).
To be fair to De Sousa, then, he is in fact engaged in the kind of humor ethics discourse that I
have recommended. His work does reflect upon the moral idiosyncrasies of humor, and operates
as a commentary on the gap between the ethics of humor, on the one hand, and generic speech
ethics, on the other. Specifically, it claims that such a gap is small or non-existent: that in producing
or appreciating humorous speech, we commit ourselves to being ‘on board’ with the claims
expressed in the speech, just as we would if we were talking – and concurring – non-humorously.
Thus, De Sousa’s dismissive account of the gap is at odds with the suppositions of this paper, but
I consider it to be to the credit of his thesis that it is based on claims about the nature of humor, as
a distinctive kind of speech act, itself.
However, De Sousa’s view has not found many adherents since it was first expressed. ‘When
Is It Wrong to Laugh?’ is typically cited as an example of undue moroseness, wrestling moral
wrongdoing from every joke that dares to generalize negatively, or exaggerate the flaws of its
target. It has been criticized by a series of philosophical writers who believe that De Sousa is too
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rigid in his appraisal of joke-tellers and joke-hearers, and has discounted the possibility that
something less than complete endorsement of the ideas expressed in an instance of humor is
needed, in order to be amused by it (see Benatar 2014; Carroll 2005; Lengbeyer 2005; Smuts
2009b). Lawrence Lengbeyer, for example, objects to the idea that one must take a malicious view
of women – or of anyone at all – in order to enjoy the kinds of jokes De Sousa thinks of as phthonic.
He observes that humor admits of a wide variety of reasons for appreciation, and that, for any
instance of humor for which sincere antagonism against a person or group is a plausible
explanation for an audience’s enjoyment, other explanations will almost certainly be viable.
Indeed, even when jokes do clearly have a particular target who is being poked fun at, “the poking
involved in joking can be fond teasing, or admiring ribbing, or gentle mocking, rather than the
righteous scorn or malicious contempt that de Sousa supposes” (2005, 311).

Hugh Lafollette and Niall Shanks
Along with De Sousa, we can also praise the work of Hugh Lafollette and Niall Shanks for
acknowledging the uniqueness of humor with a view to building a theory of ethics on the topic. In
their 1993 paper ‘Belief and the Basis of Humor’, Lafollette and Shanks first offer an account of
what happens when a person finds something funny, and then explain, off the back of this account,
when and why humorous talk can be morally flawed. The authors ultimately claim that humor
necessarily involves an audience of agents “whose belief systems manifest hierarchical cognitive
richness” (331), meaning that the agents in question are capable of engaging in higher-order
cognitive processes that take their own beliefs as their object. This ability allows agents to
“structure [their] first order beliefs,” from time to time “bringing some of them to the focus of
attention while relegating others to the periphery” (332). The authors emphasize manifestations of
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this phenomenon that involve a person seeing some event from different perspectives. So, what is
observed is potentially ambiguous, and an intelligent agent can volitionally view it alternately in
one way or another. Humor arises when we perceive something that causes us to move back and
forth, rapidly, from one perspective to another. The authors talk of this process as a “flickering”
between perspectives (1993, 333), in which one focuses one’s attention on a particular set of beliefs
or attitudes at one time, then on a separate set, and then back again (and so on).
I believe, however, that Lafollette and Shanks have overplayed their hand regarding the link
between humor and the ‘flickering’ they describe. Their analysis works well when it comes to
accounting for things like puns, paradoxes, and reference humor – but I think it is hard to accept
that this flickering is literally constitutive of some phenomenon being an instance of humor. It does
not seem to tally well, in particular, with what we might think of as ‘base’ or lowbrow humor.
Finding slapstick humor amusing, for example, does not seem to require flickering of the kind the
authors describe.
When I laugh at the awkward, gurning physicality of Rowan Atkinson’s remarkable
performances as the character of Mr. Bean, it is not possible to identify which two or more
perspectives I am supposed to be using my higher-order belief patterns to flicker rapidly between.
In one episode of Mr. Bean, Bean attends a beginner’s judo class. He approaches his first sparring
bout with a preposterous, robotic stiffness, appearing bewildered by, and unprepared for, even
basic actions like walking to the center of the judo mat. It is funny to watch. But does it encourage
us to switch from one set of relevant beliefs to another, and quickly back again, altering our
perspective on the scene as we go? If so, what are these beliefs between which we are flickering?
Do we see Mr. Bean, in one moment, as a blundering incompetent, but in the next as a virtuoso
judoka? It doesn’t seem that we do: he is ill-equipped for the task at hand, and we know this, from
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the start of the sketch to the finish. Are we flickering between our beliefs about how Mr. Bean is
acting, and our understanding of how we might approach the same task? This tallies with how
Sigmund Freud viewed slapstick comedy: he believed that our amusement at absurdist slapstick
comes from our making a comparison between the relatively small amount of energy it would take
we ourselves to perform a task, and the comparatively huge exertions of the comic fool whose
actions we are witnessing (Freud 1990, 304-306). But Freud’s analysis of slapstick is not much
favored in the modern day (see Hurley et al 2013, 44; Morreall 2009, 22) – and, in any event, it is
not clear why we should think that there is any rapid movement from one interpretation or
perspective to another, and back again, going on in the ‘judo’ case. We do not need to bring one
set of beliefs to the forefront of our minds, and then relegate that set to the background and allow
another to occupy our most immediate thoughts, and then revert back to our original higher-order
epistemic state, to enjoy his behavior: simply noticing that his actions are wildly out-of-theordinary will suffice. I believe that I would approach a judo spar somewhat more elegantly than
Atkinson’s character does; but that thought does not move in and out of prominence in my mind
as I watch the scene unfold. And even if it did, it is not clear that this would constitute any shift in
perspective regarding what I am watching. And even if it would, I would not need to rapidly flip
back and forth between thinking about my hypothetical judo and Mr. Bean’s, in order to be
comically amused.
In addition to its shortcomings when it comes to defining humor, the authors’ account also
leads them to draw dubious ethical conclusions. They give the following explanation for why
humor can be a tool of social oppression:
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[The ‘flickering’ account] helps explain what specifically is objectionable about racist or
sexist "humor." On our view what is morally offensive is not the joke per se, but the
underlying beliefs and attitudes which such jokes betoken.
Recall that a person's belief that an event, action, or claim is humorous depends upon the
higher order beliefs which she has and to which she currently attends. A joke which
belittled women, then, could only be humorous to someone who had the appropriate sort
of higher-order beliefs, in particular, beliefs that women are mentally or morally inferior
to men. Hence, what is disturbing about this humor is not the bare joke, but what that joke
indicates about those who find the joke humorous. (1993, 337)
Plenty of humor is belittling to women, and I suspect that plenty succeeds, in some cases, on
an audience having latent or express beliefs about the moral or intellectual inferiority of women to
men. 6 But what Lafollette and Shanks write here is too quick. On one possible reading of their
claim that humor that belittles women requires its audience to believe that women are morally or
intellectually inferior, they are ascribing too regressive an epistemic set to relatively innocent
people who happen to enjoy some politically incorrect jokes. On the other potential interpretation,
they are defining ‘humor that belittles women’ so narrowly that it applies to barely any instances
of humor at all. On the former interpretation, their morally-relevant assertions are too stern; on the
latter, not stern enough.
Firstly, suppose that we take ‘humor that belittles women’ to have a definition independent of
Lafollette and Shanks’ ascriptions to it, and that we take it to be defined broadly enough that it
applies to a substantial range of humor that one might come across in everyday life. So maybe

Contrary to Lafollette and Shanks, I see no reason to describe these sexist views as ‘higher-order’; but
that dispute is not important presently.
6
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humor belittles women iff, counterfactually, had the content of the instance of humor been
straightforwardly proposed rather than expressed playfully, it would constitute a false and insulting
characterization of women as a group. 7 Now, here is a joke that answers that description:
If your girlfriend gives you the silent treatment, the key is to pretend that you don’t like it.
Let’s use this joke as the point of reference when we assess whether Lafollette and Shanks’
ascriptions about jokes that belittle women are true. Note, first, that the idea that this joke requires
its hearers to have sexist beliefs about the inferiority of women does not follow from the flickering
view simpliciter. Lafollette and Shanks seem to imply that it should: they explain the crucial points
of the flickering account, and then write that “a joke which belittled women, then, could only be
humorous to [a sexist]” (1993, 337, emphasis mine). But there is no such entailment. A joke that
belittles women, per the flickering view, must require hearers to switch between some sets of
beliefs – but none of those beliefs necessarily have to be sexist. The joke above could, in keeping
with the flickering view, require us merely to flicker between the concept of silent treatment as a
punishment, and the relief from irritating conversation as a treat; or between a perspective in which
one group appears to be manipulating a second, and one in which the second group turns out to
have been getting its own way all along. Neither perspective must, for any reason that follows
directly from the principles of the flickering view, involve endorsing the idea that women are
generally less intelligent, or of lesser moral value, than members of any other gender.

This definition strikes me as plausible, and, as I imply, has significant reference amongst the jokes
people tell in the real world. For those reasons, it functions acceptably as an example of the kind of
definition that would leave Lafollette and Shanks’ claims about humor looking unhelpfully strict. But I
am not married to it. If you intuitively define ‘humor that belittles women’ differently, feel free to replace
my own definition with yours.

7
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And when we imagine this joke being told in practice, nothing is added that suggests any such
condition for enjoying it. Holding sexist beliefs about the moral or mental inferiority of women
may well be a part of one route to being comically amused by the line. But it is by no means a
requirement: it is not impossible (or even difficult) to imagine perfectly unsexist audience
members appreciating the joke because they understand the disconnect between intention and
effect that it plays upon. But in fact, even if we limit our interest to those who enjoy this joke
because they do have problematic beliefs about women, nothing so extensive or precise as a belief
that women are all-things-considered less intelligent or morally important than other genders needs
to obtain. Imagine a joke-hearer who buys into a number of chauvinistic stereotypes about women:
she thinks that women are unusually empathetic, relative to other genders, but also that they are
typically not inclined towards the natural sciences; that they are good multi-taskers, but also that
they are prone to being led by their emotions. She also believes that women tend to enjoy chitchat, and that this is frequently a source of annoyance to their romantic partners. So when she hears
the joke, she is amused because she thinks it has a certain ring of truth: ‘Yes, women do go on a
bit, don’t they?’ It is consistent with this joke-hearer having these regressive assumptions that she
might not think that women are altogether inferior to men, either mentally or morally. She might
think that, when you sum all the gifts belonging to different genders, ultimately you end up at
moral and intellectual parity. She might even think, as some male chauvinists do or at least claim
to, that women are ultimately somewhat superior to men, what with the latter’s famed inability to
take people’s feelings into account and liability to be influenced by their libido. In that case, we
would have a sexist laughing at this joke that belittles women, and doing so because of her sexist
views, without having the epistemic commitments that Shanks and Lafollette claim to be necessary
to enjoy humor that belittles women.
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On the other hand, we can read the authors as meaning that no instance of humor counts as
being belittling to women unless it requires its audience, in order to be amused by it, to believe
that women are intellectually or morally inferior to men. In that case, the authors’ claim effectively
amounts to stating that it is impossible for humor to belittle women, since, for the reasons already
mentioned in this section, there will be practically zero jokes that can only be enjoyed by someone
who is committed to one such idea. The ambiguity of humor will allow for the possibility of
someone being amused by any misogynistic joke for reasons other than the sexist beliefs they refer
to, and so for all misogynistic humor to count, under their definition of the term, as not belittling
women. I believe that that claim is false, and that there are instances of humor that belittle women.
But even if it was true, it wouldn’t be interesting: it would amount to the fact that, since ‘belittling
to women’ actually has quite a specific definition, technically there are no jokes that belittle
women. That’s like one of those annoying half-facts a precocious eight year-old might tell you.
Did you know that the Statue of Liberty technically isn’t in New York, and that World War II is
technically still ongoing because certain belligerents technically haven’t agreed to a declaration of
peace?
Ultimately, I cannot rule out the possibility that, on some occasions, it may be possible to
produce some airtight demonstration that a joke-teller, or a joke-hearer, must have believed a
particular claim to be true, based on the fact that they engaged in the instance of humor they
engaged with in the way that they did. I will merely say that I have never witnessed any such
demonstration for any instance of humor, and that, accordingly, I am not optimistic that any are
forthcoming. Certainly I think that we will never be able to move from attributions of mental states
of that precision to any thorough and practical ethics of humor, in which we are able to
satisfactorily answer the kinds of questions of interest to actual, morally concerned joke-tellers.
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Conclusion
Much of the existing literature on the topic of humor ethics is doomed to fail to answer the
genuinely interesting philosophical questions about right and wrong conduct in joke-sharing,
because it fails to properly demarcate humor from other human behavior. Theoretical work that
suffers from this shortcoming will be required to sort through so many prior debates before it can
address humor-specific issues that it will never realistically get there.
At the same time, a number of the prominent accounts of humor ethics that do treat humor as
an interestingly idiosyncratic phenomenon draw conclusions that are too quick, such that they are
vulnerable to counterexamples. What is required – and what I seek to provide in the remainder of
my dissertation – is an account of the ethics of humor that renders some instances of humor morally
permissible and others impermissible, without offering guidance as unduly restrictive as De
Sousa’s, and without making the unsupportable claim that any particular joke requires a single,
specific epistemic state on the part of its teller or its audience. 8

Sections of this chapter have previously appeared in my article “Focusing on the Gap” (Butterfield
2022).
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CHAPTER TWO – SOME MECHANISMS OF HUMOR

Why Comedy Is Difficult to Define
This chapter is concerned with pointing out some aspects of the metaphysics of comedy. I will do
this so that I can later use the observed features to explain why humor can be the site of moral
wrongdoing; why it is morally idiosyncratic when compared with other kinds of speech; and how
we can use those idiosyncrasies to draw conclusions about the moral value of some jokes. But it
is worth first conceding that the observations made in this chapter are unlikely to apply to every
single conceivable instance of humorous speech. I herein note tendential features of humor: I make
the claim that comic speech will generally operate the way that I describe. But I do not guarantee
that my observations will be entirely invulnerable to counterexamples – and before I make the
most substantive claims of this chapter, I want to explain why this is.
Within the literature that exists on the philosophy of humor, perhaps the most fundamental and
popular endeavour is establishing a necessary condition or conditions for some phenomenon to
count as an instance of humor (see Boyd 2004; Clark 1970; Freud 1990; Hobbes 1962; Lippit
1995; Shaftesbury 1709) – and the philosophical consensus has coalesced around definitions of
‘humor’ that identify incongruity as its essential feature (see Carroll 2005; Hutcheson 1750; and
Morreall 2009 acknowledges the prevalence of incongruity theories without endorsing them). In
broad terms, these theories claim that every instance of humor rests upon the presence, and
perception, of some kind of incongruity. As Noël Carroll puts it, for example, comic amusement
is elicited when an agent perceives an occurrence or phenomenon as incongruous; is not worried
or frightened by the perceived incongruity; does not feel invited to solve the perceived incongruity;
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and, instead, enjoys it (2005, 351). We can say that philosophers of humor have largely settled, at
this point in the history of the philosophy of comedy, on the notion of incongruity as a necessary
condition of humor: whatever else any instance of humor might contain or do, it will, if it warrants
the name, present its audience with something incongruous.
And since comedy inherently aims towards subversion of some kind, substantive definitions
of what counts as humorous will always be fleeting. In the same way that a stand-up comic might
deny her audience the punchline they expect to hear at the climax of a comical anecdote, and in
that way render her material as an example of anti-comedy, the moment some phenomenon
becomes an observed feature essential to examples of humor, there will be practitioners of humor
who seek to eliminate it from their fare to get a laugh. As an example of this phenomenon:
traditional, theatre-based farce sets up a series of events that coincide in just the right way, so as
to cause the maximum level of misadventure for its characters. This set-up is now familiar to
audiences, who can generally recognize the tropes and rhythm of the genre, including: a wellmeaning main character with a specific set of tasks that need to be completed in a close-ended
timeframe; the presence of physical comedy and slapstick; and a continuous escalation of the pace
and intensity of the pratfalls that befall the central characters. The fact that the format is, by now,
easily recognizable allows modern, ironic takes upon the genre – such as The Play That Goes
Wrong, a West End comedy whose story involves a group of actors attempting to stage a farcical
murder mystery play, and failing spectacularly; or a That Mitchell and Webb Sound sketch in which
the proprietor of a drama company is waylaid by a series of spectacular and unfortunate
coincidences, while trying to write a new comic farce – to undercut and satirize its paradigms for
comic effect.
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But the existence of this kind of ‘nod-and-wink’ to the cliches of farce can itself be undercut.
In an episode of Family Guy, Peter Griffin is flung out of a medieval catapult. We see him sail
through the air, above the rooftops of the suburban neighborhood in which the Griffins live. The
scene quickly cuts to a hitherto-unfeatured character in his living room, delivering the following
monologue:
“Excellent, these dominoes are set up exactly as I want them: right next to the good china.
Now I’ll just place this priceless Faberge egg in the center, right next to my newborn,
hemophiliac baby.”
The scene is set, of course, for exactly the kind of joke made in the That Mitchell and Webb
Sound sketch: a calamitous accident, the likes of which is classic farcical fare, occurs – but, in
setting up the chaos so explicitly, the narrative laughs at its own contrivances. In Family Guy,
though, this does not happen. Instead, Griffin lands in a heap in the unnamed character’s garden,
then walks up to his window to inspect the dominoes, china, ornament and child.
“Hey, are those yours?”
“Yes!”
“Oh. Those are all really nice things.”
“Thank `you!” Then, turning to the baby: “You hear that, Evan? We were complimented!”
(McFarlane 2006)
The scene is, if you like, a joke on a joke on a joke. We are so obviously conditioned to expect
Griffin to crash through the window, colliding with the precious items in the room, that we initially
interpret the scene as an instance of meta-humor: the narrative drawing attention to how easily you
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can see its own climax coming. Then comes the real punchline, which is that the spectacular
dénouement is replaced by a conversation that is unremarkable to the point of banality. This is how
comedy (often) works: the comic creator presents something that defies expectations, and the
expectations in question are set, in part, by the way that comedy has defied expectations in the
past. The goalposts are constantly moving.
Now we see the difficulty facing any theorist who would establish any new aspect of a
definition of the funny: they are engaged with the endeavor of defining a medium that, at its heart,
is about straying from precedent and upsetting definitions. For this reason, I will not attempt to
claim that my observations about humor in the preceding chapter are airtight, or that one will never
be able to identify an instance of humor that serves as a counterexample to them. To say something
like that would be to tempt fate. The other reason that I do not intend to make any such claim,
however, is that I do not need to. My current project is to map the moral contours of joke speech,
and to that end, I seek to make some observations about what jokes tend to be like. To achieve
this, there is no need for me to establish precise necessary and sufficient conditions for some
speech to count as humorous: it is enough to describe what comedy tends to look like, so that I
may then explain the moral implications of these tendencies. If you can find some example of
comedy that does not conform to the descriptions I have offered, that’s okay – my claims about
the moral features of jokes will not apply strictly in this instance. But they will apply, nonetheless,
on many other occasions.

A Wrong Answer
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In the previous chapter, I observed that Amy Schumer’s joke was not the same speech act as a
hypothetical one in which one sincerely claims that Hispanic men are rapists – and that, of the two,
what Schumer actually said is morally preferable. These observations are not trivial. In everyday
discussion, one frequently finds critics of instances of humor engaging with them as if they are not
instances of humor at all – or, at least, as if they can be assessed, morally, in exactly the same way
in which we assess non-humorous speech. Many objectors to instances of offensive humor respond
to them with rhetorical flat-footed credulity, acting as if the joke-teller has made her comment not
with irony or the intention to amuse, but as a claim about the world in earnest. This happened
when, in early 2002, the comedian Joan Rivers told a joke about the widows of firefighters who
had died during the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11. Having heard that the widows each
stood to receive approximately $5 million in compensation for their loss, Rivers made a joke to
the effect that, if their husbands were to turn up, alive and unharmed, they would now be terribly
disappointed (Sawai 2009). The joke prompted an angry response from the General President of
the International Association of Fire Fighters, Harold Shaitberger. An extract from his statement:
First, let me be clear to Ms. Rivers that our widows would give anything to have their
husbands back. The loss they suffered in an instant was total and profound, and no efforts
by anyone can make that pain go away. But, as you have proven, it can be made more
painful with a resentful remark or a caustic comment.
Second, these courageous women have received very little in real terms in exchange for
what they have lost. The financial burdens of losing a primary breadwinner, feeding,
clothing and educating hundreds of fatherless children, and planning for decades of your
own life without your loved one are overwhelming. Ms. Rivers should check her facts. The
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widows and families haven't received anything near $5 million, but even if they had, it
would not equal what they have lost. (Shaitberger 2002)
In clarifying, as if for Rivers’ benefit, that the widows of firefighters who died during 9/11
would in fact be upset by the deaths of their husbands, Shaitberger rhetorically implied that she
claimed otherwise. She did not. Rivers was, of course, aware that they would be upset, and did not
claim anything to the contrary. Shaitberger’s wording here was presumably designed to emphasize
how awful Rivers’ speech was: what kind of monster actually thinks that these women would be
pleased by such a series of events? And one can certainly understand why he would seek to
position Rivers uncharitably, since he was hurt by her comments and had a professional and
affiliative responsibility to represent the interests of his colleagues and their families. However, in
presenting Rivers as if she was so bizarrely devoid of human empathy that she would be sincerely
oblivious to the fact that women are typically saddened by their husbands’ deaths, his response
failed to get to the heart of what Rivers did wrong (if she did do something wrong). It made a clear
and tidy, but false, accusation – Rivers literally claimed that the widows of our deceased colleagues
will be pleased about their deaths – rather than engage with the messy, difficult facts of what the
comedian actually said, and how we should feel about it.
A similarly flat-footed position is adopted by Dennis Howitt and Kwame Owusu-Bempah, in
their book chapter ‘Race and Ethnicity in Popular Humour’, with regards to a racist experience
that one of them once suffered in a store. The story goes like this:
A few years ago, a black person was inside a local shop when a man covered in coal dust
entered and placed his hand next to the black person’s. He then chanted ‘I wanna be like
you, black like you…’. This was objected to on the grounds that, unlike the ‘joker’, he was
black and not dirty. Those in the shop joined in the denial of racism: ‘it’s only a joke’, they
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said, almost in unison. One of them actually counselled him (the victim) to cultivate a sense
of humour in order to ‘get on in this world’. This is not a hypothetical example. The incident
involved one of the authors of this chapter.
What does it tell us? Clearly pointing to the underlying assumptions in the ‘joke’ caused
conversational difficulties for the white people in the shop. (Howitt and Owusu-Bempah
2005, 45.) 9
This occurrence was certainly racist. It is part of a particular brand of white British microaggression against members of ethnic minority groups, whereby their racial identity and
‘otherness’ is continuously reinforced and belittled, to subtly establish whiteness as the ‘default’,
and proper, identity. It also – as the authors touch on – makes reference to clearly-bigoted
associations of racial blackness with dirtiness and inferiority.
Elements of the characterization of the situation by Howitt and Owusu-Bempah are wide of
the mark, however. When the victim objects to the joke “on the grounds that…he was black and
not dirty,” he responds in a way that would be appropriate, had the joke-teller literally said that his
skin was dirty. The fact that the authors have placed ‘joke’ and ‘joker’ in inverted commas suggests
that they believe that this was, secretly, the case: the joke-teller was not telling a joke at all, but
making a sincere and literal claim. They suggest that, in objecting the way he did, the victim
exposed the “underlying assumptions” of the joke – which would seem to imply that the authors
believe that an underlying assumption of the joke is that black people have dark skin because of
accumulated dirt. Like Shaitberger, then, they adopt a studied literal-mindedness that allows them

Howitt and Owusu-Bempah do not mention this explicitly in their chapter, but it is presumable that the
white man in this anecdote is a coal miner, covered in dust as a result of his work. The coal dust is
incidental and his racist joking opportunistic; he did not darken his skin deliberately for the purposes of
the interaction.
9
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to suppose that the aggressor does something that is wrong for obvious and straightforward reasons
– he literally claimed that black people have dark skin because they are covered in dirt – rather
than having to engage with the complex, obscure reasons that the aggressor acts badly.
In each of these cases, what happens is that the agent reacting to the joke notices something
true – that the joker, in telling their joke, has said something insensitive or problematic – but has
opted for an explanation of that fact that is too quick.

Humor Is Not Literally Assertive
Why are Shaitberger and Howitt and Owusu-Bempah’s explanations too quick? Why is it possible
to tell, and to be amused by, a joke without endorsing the attitudes that a literalist interpretation
would find in it? And why was Amy Schumer less egregiously in the wrong, in the actual case in
which she joked that Hispanic men were rapists, than in the counterfactual one in which she says
so straightforwardly?
One useful first pass at answering these questions is to note that, when I say something and I
am not joking, I typically assert the literal content of my speech. When I tell a joke, on the other
hand, I typically do not make any such assertion. As Victor Raskin puts it, joke-telling is a form
of non-bona-fide communication: a joker is not earnestly attempting to convey information to her
audience with minimal ambiguity and in accordance with H.P. Grice’s ‘co-operative principle’, as
she would be in the case of bona fide communication. (Raskin 1985, 100; and see Grice 1991, 28.)
So, if I tell you, non-jokingly, that Irish people are stupid, you are justified in understanding me as
having asserted that it is true that Irish people are stupid. If I tell you the same thing, but (you know
that) I am joking, you cannot reasonably infer that I have asserted this. Something like this
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observation is also acknowledged in Noël Carroll’s 1991 article ‘On Jokes’, where he notes that
finding, for example, a racist statement funny is not the same as considering it to be literally true
– and, in fact, believing such a statement would be an impediment to finding it funny, because one
does not find amusement in straightforward descriptions of the world as it actually is (or as one
actually believes it to be) (296).
Some philosophical accounts define assertion in terms of a speaker making a commitment –
either by staking her social reputation on the asserted proposition being true, or by accepting
responsibility for retracting the assertion, if she is presented with convincing evidence of its untruth
(see Boyd 2016, 21-22; MacFarlane 2005, 320). Others take assertion to be a matter of expressing
one’s relationship with a proposition: either by simply indicating that one judges the proposition
to be true, or by intending one’s speech to be taken as a reason, on the hearer’s part, for believing
that one holds the relevant belief (see Beaney 1997, 22; Williams 2002, 73-74). I do not need to
adjudicate between the differing theories of assertion in order to map what is morally interesting
about humorous speech. But I mention these accounts because they help us note features of
paradigmatic cases of assertion that have value in explaining what it is that makes assertion a
morally relevant concept. The philosophers who take self-representation of belief to be central to
assertion bring to the fore the fact that a person’s assertion of a proposition gives us reason to
believe that they believe it. Now: since some beliefs are, for example, racist, having reason to
believe that a person believes a proposition can help us to establish that that person is a racist (or
that they exhibit racist behavior). Speech that includes an assertion that, say, Asian people are
untrustworthy gives us stronger reason to believe that the speaker holds racist views than does
some statement short of assertion. So, since in joke-telling we do not assert what we literally say,
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there will be instances of speech that, if they are said seriously, give us good reason to suspect that
the speaker has morally bad views; but, if they are said jokingly, give us no such reason.
Then, on the other hand, consider the view that asserting involves committing oneself to a
proposition. This view, too, can help illuminate why the fact of having made an assertion has moral
import. When we commit ourselves to the truth of some representation of the world, we give our
hearers reason to believe that that representation is true (reason that can be stronger or weaker,
depending on our credibility and our relationship with our audience). This can then have
consequences in the world, since, if we are understood correctly and judged to be credible, the
people we speak to will then operate under the presupposition that the world is as we say it is. So,
if I assert to my friend that Asian people are untrustworthy, and she has substantially high regard
for my assertions, and she later finds herself hiring staff for some job, she is liable to rank the
suitability of Asian candidates as lower than they deserve.
Regardless of which account of assertion one subscribes to, it is clear that an assertion both
reveals a particular belief that its asserter holds, and has the potential to convince others of the
truth of the proposition asserted. After all, if I represent myself as believing proposition P, then,
provided that you think of me as sufficiently competent with respect to my standing to know
whether or not P is true, you will be more inclined to believe P than you would have been in the
absence of the representation. And, on the other side, if I stake my reputation on a bet that P is
true, it is reasonable to conclude that I believe that P is true. The moral valence of assertion comes,
then, both from assertion’s link to belief, and from its link to persuasion.
Thus, attributing stupidity to the Irish, or a proclivity towards rape to Hispanic men, as a joke,
tends more towards innocuousness than making the respective attributions sincerely – and this is
because, falling short of literal assertion, the joking characterizations do not represent their tellers
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as necessarily having any particular view about the intellectual abilities of the Irish or the incidence
of criminal sexual behavior amongst Hispanic men; nor do they give their hearers justificatory
reasons for increasing their credence towards any such associations.

A Puzzle
So we arrive at a puzzle: how are we to preserve the possibility of moral condemnation for any
instance of humorous speech, given that humor is not assertive? Many of us will feel that there is
something upsetting about jokes like Schumer’s, or Rivers’, and certainly about that experienced
by Howitt or Owusu-Bempah. The challenge is to explain why it should be so. Granted, it makes
perfect sense to think that a person who claims that Hispanic men are sex criminals, or that widows
of firefighters will be counting their blessings, or that black people are dirty, is doing something
morally wrong. But I have argued that our jokers did not claim any of those things, and in so doing,
I have ceded ground over the very thing that seems to underpin legitimate moral criticism of speech
in most cases. Hate speech from a public soapbox is a terrible thing – but it is a terrible thing
because the speaker means exactly what she is saying, or because her audience has reason to
understand her as vouching for it. How can we account for misbehavior in joke-telling when we
have foreclosed on the chance to say the same thing about humorous speech?
This is the question I intend to answer over the next chapter and a half. In what remains of this
chapter, I theorize about the nature of humor, with a view to explaining how an instance of humor
can, despite its non-assertiveness, express the beliefs and attitudes of its teller (or audience). And
in Chapter Three, I use this framework to draw conclusions about what kinds of criticisms we can
issue about jokers who have malicious intentions, and about those who have benign ones.
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Some Reflections on the Nature of Comedy
First we need to pull our focus back, and considering the nature of comedy itself. Recalling the
philosophers of comedy we considered above, we can bring to mind the fact that humor necessarily
involves the presentation of something incongruous. To amuse us, a piece of comedy has to present
us with something that undermines, or defies, some previously-established standard or expectation.
But when we consider this claim, we may be struck, soon after, by another thought. Namely:
appropriate though it may be as a necessary condition for humor, incongruity falls far short of
being a sufficient condition for it. Many incongruities are not funny. This point is well-made by
Alexander Bain when he lists off a host of scenarios in which incongruity obtains, but by which it
is unlikely that anyone would be comically amused. Observes Bain:
There are many incongruities that may produce anything but a laugh. A decrepit man under
a heavy burden, five loaves and two fishes among a multitude, and all unfitness and gross
disproportion; an instrument out of tune, a fly in ointment, snow in May, Archimedes
studying geometry in a siege, and all discordant things; a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a breach
of bargain, and falsehood in general; the multitude taking the law in their own hands, and
everything of the nature of disorder; a corpse at a feast, parental cruelty, filial ingratitude,
and whatever is unnatural; the entire catalogue of the vanities given by Solomon, are all
incongruous, but they cause feelings of pain, anger, sadness, loathing, rather than mirth.
(Bain 2006, 257; quoted in Amir 2018, 214, and Hurley et al. 2013, 48)

Not Just Any Old Incongruity Will Do
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So, what kind of incongruity does do the trick? What specific kind of incongruity does one have
to perceive, in order to experience comic amusement?
I confess that I do not know the precise answer to this question. I would like to, but if there is
a straightforward rule for creating funniness, I am afraid that I do not have access to it. My only
solace is that nobody else seems to, either – as evidenced by the fact that even the most talented
comedian occasionally cracks a joke that does not land. If anyone was ever to fully understand
exactly what kind of incongruity was needed to create, and to maximize, humor, perhaps she would
ruin it for the rest of us forever. With the mystery gone, we might simply lose interest in amusing
each other comically, and stick to seriousness hencewith. But this dissertation poses no such threat,
because, as I say, I do not know exactly what needs to be added to mere incongruity to produce
laughs. However, I will try to gesture towards a particular twist on the simple presence of
incongruity that seems to ground most examples of humor, and whose presence or absence from a
skit, quip or anecdote seems to correlate closely with that attempt at humor being funny, or not
funny, respectively.
Here is that twist: for something to be funny, the incongruity that is present in it must in some
way emerge from, or only be fully understood in the context of, some other event or idea – and
that second event or idea should be congruous, rather than incongruous. So, the transgressive
‘punchline’ must in some way be related to a quotidian ‘set-up’ or ‘condition’. 10 Comedy is not in
the witnessing something unexpected, then: it is in the witnessing something unexpected and
having something unremarkable also be manifest, in order that we might compare, or see some
link between, the former and the latter. A joke will present us with an unusual occurrence; but it
By using the terms ‘punchline’, ‘set-up’, and ‘condition’, I do not mean to imply that there is a
necessary chronological order in instances of humor. Oftentimes a piece of comedy presents us with the
incongruity first, allowing us to be puzzled by it, before providing the congruous context for it afterwards.
10
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will also present us with a series of normal events before or after that occurrence, with which we
are to contextualize it, and to which the unusual occurrence relates causally or thematically. The
congruous part can be stipulated explicitly or assumed as a piece of prior understanding, and it is
almost always some aspect of the congruous part that we are missing when we fail to ‘get’ the
joke: if we ask a joke-teller to explain their joke, we are asking for them to make us familiar with
some congruity to which its incongruous details relate.
While analyzing attack humor, Berys Gaut considers former British Chancellor of the
Exchequer Denis Healey’s barbed quip about former Conservative Member of Parliament
Geoffrey Howe, to the effect that being cross-examined by Howe was like ‘being savaged by a
dead sheep’. Says Gaut of Healey’s diss:
Jokes that are grounded on an attack can misfire, and so be unfunny, because they are
inappropriate to their target. What makes Healey’s remark so amusing is that he exactly
captured the ineffective nature of Howe’s attack on him, the sense that Howe wanted to
wound him, but did not have the wherewithal to do so, and that he did so by adverting to
Howe’s rather impressively woolly head of hair. (Gaut 1998, 60)
So what Healey said is amusing because it has incongruity – it equates a human with an animal;
it brings to mind a deceased being performing a deliberate action; it adverts to an attack by a beast
we typically code as docile – but also because it has congruity – Howe’s badinage was ineffective
and harmless; he did bear a certain physical resemblance to a sheep. What Healey said would not
be funny if it featured congruity in the absence of incongruity (‘being debated by Howe is not as
intimidating as Howe obviously hopes it would be’), and would also not be funny if it featured
incongruity in the absence of congruity (‘being debated by Howe is like drinking a ceramic
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briefcase’). It is necessary, for a joke to be humorous, that it offers both parts, and that each part
has some logical link to the other.
Furthermore, this seems not to be just a binary requirement, that sorts items that qualify as ‘an
instance of humor’ from items that do not. Instead, there is a tendency to the effect that, when one
instance of humor manifests a contrast in congruousness between its set-up or condition and its
punchline more intensely than a second, the first will, barring independent factors, be funnier than
the second. There is a correlation, then, between how congruous the congruous part of an instance
of humor is, how incongruous the incongruous part is, and how seamlessly the latter part emerges
from or relates to the former, on the one hand, and how funny the instance of humor is, on the
other. Jokes are better when their set-ups fit, entirely unremarkably, within the set of expectations
and understandings that their audiences already have, and when their punchlines emerge logically
from those expectations but, themselves, diverge drastically from the norm. If I tell you a joke
where the set-up involves perfectly normal characters with perfectly imaginable motivations and
attitudes, who perform actions that are perfectly routine, and where the punchline describes
occurrences that are wildly, outrageously transgressive, and in which the punchline materializes
out of the set-up by way of a perfectly understandable set of consequences or inferences, my joke
is very likely to be well-received. On the other hand, if my joke requires me to stipulate a huge
array of unusual details in the set-up – “there’s a florist, right, but he’s also a secret agent, and his
sister is a homophobic feminist; oh, and by the way, they don’t know they’re brother and sister…”
– and in which a very mildly incongruous punchline results – “so he ends up at completely the
wrong grocery store!” – and in which the punchline relates only tenuously to the rest of the joke,
my joke will be a dud.
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By virtue of this tendency, it can be illustrative to think of the creation and delivery of comedy
as being a bit like a feat of endurance or a magic trick. If a joker is able to show you something
that is very highly incongruous, that is like a performer accomplishing some task that requires a
great deal of strength, or athleticism, or ingenuity. And if they are able to do so while starting from
a set-up that seems entirely unremarkable, that is like accomplishing this feat while under great
duress or restraint. The joker effectively says, ‘Ta-dah! I have shown you something highly
incongruous – and what is more: I have done so through a logical series of events that results from
a highly congruous starting point’. Compare this to the magical performer who says, ‘Ta-dah! I
have disappeared and reappeared at the top of a 100-foot plinth – and what is more: I have done
so having previously been locked inside a safe, submerged in water, and with my hands tied behind
my back’. The more impressive the feat of extracting incongruity from congruity, the more
comically amused the joker’s audience is likely to be.

Some Examples of the Foregoing Claims
I think that, as you consider your favorite pieces of comedy through the ‘congruity-andincongruity’ lens established in the previous section, you will find that the present account is highly
versatile, applying to a great many instances of humor that may appear, at first glance, to be utterly
unlike one another. I won’t bore you with a laundry list of cases that exemplify my point. But do
let me offer some.
In season nine, episode five of the U.S. version of the sitcom The Office, jobsworth antagonistic
Dwight Schrute gets a pumpkin stuck on his head. In montage we see Dwight easing the pumpkin
onto his head, while, in voiceover, he explains that it was an attempt “to get into the spirit of
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Halloween” (Ellickson and Scanlon 2012). The montage Dwight pranks his colleague Erin by
creeping up behind her and scaring her with his besquashed visage – but the joke soon backfires,
as we watch Dwight fail to remove the pumpkin from his head, and subsequently be forced to go
about his everyday workplace tasks while trapped inside the fruit. He attends an office presentation
and asks questions of the speaker; he eats lunch in the lunch room; and he walks to his car in the
parking lot – all while still wearing the enormous imitation jack-o’-lantern. Voiceover Dwight tells
us solemnly that the decision to wear the pumpkin “may have been the costliest [he has] ever
made”, and (in a tone that is a little cheerier) explains his hope that it will “rot off in a month or
two” (Ellickson and Scanlon 2012). The incongruity of this scene comes from seeing a grown man
attempt to go about his business in such obviously bizarre headgear. The congruous part is the
story of how Dwight got into such a bind: we can imagine a person (especially one with as many
previously-established idiosyncrasies as Schrute) going to the lengths involved to celebrate
Halloween, since costume play and pumpkins are both thematically linked thereto; and since
pranking a co-worker with one’s unusual appearance is an imaginable scenario within an American
workplace; and since we are familiar with the possibility of paradoxically being unable to extract
one’s head from a location we previously inserted it into.
The scene is funny. It was popular with fans of the show, and is sometimes cited as a rare hit
at a point, late in the series’ run, where the plots and dialog had begun to run out of steam a little.
But it would be nowhere near as funny if all we were shown was the incongruous part of this scene.
So, imagine that what actually happened in this episode was that Dwight simply went about his
day with his head inside some conspicuous produce. (To remove the logical leap we might make
to Halloween simply by virtue of seeing a pumpkin, suppose that he had his head inside a
watermelon, instead.) Imagine that the story behind Dwight’s headwear was never addressed in
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the episode: we were simply presented with the incongruous image of a middle-manager wearing
fruit or veg as a helmet. Alternatively, imagine that it was addressed, but very lazily: “Oh look,
Dwight is randomly feeling zany today and has put a melon on his head.” Such a substitution
would rob the scene of its humor. But notice that the incongruity is still present here: we still watch
a man work his white-collar job with groceries on his head. Overall, the incongruity of the scene
would actually be heightened, not diminished: Dwight’s behavior would be even more out-ofplace than it was previously, since we could not even begin to comprehend its causes. If this was
what happened in this episode of The Office, then, we would get more incongruity and less comic
amusement. This demonstrates my point that humor is based on an interplay between incongruity
and congruity, and that one without the other is unlikely to be funny. To return to the analogy of
the magical performance: we would not be impressed if the trick was “Ta-dah! I present to you, a
man wearing some fruit”; but we are likely to be impressed by “Ta-dah! I present to you, a man
wearing some fruit, and a broadly plausible story about how this scenario results from a series of
events stemming from some fairly prosaic office hijinks.” Anyone can create the first thing, but
conjuring up the second is a feat more worth applauding.
But let us move from a case in which an instance of humor is successful, to cases in which
attempts to amuse fail. The congruity-and-incongruity theory does a good job of explaining why
jokes are less funny if they are obviously contrived. So take the following jokes (which I sourced
from an online message board in which contributors offered examples of ‘contrived humor’):
1) A church wanted to host a bronze sculpting class and invited some celebrity guests to
pose as models. The class waited to see which celebs would turn up and were thrilled
to see Vijay Singh, the Fijian PGA golfer, arrive. They all rushed forward to start work
on him and one poor student was shoved aside and left out while the others started
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work on Vijay. Then Mick Jagger walked in and they all went berserk and raced
towards him, once again pushing aside the same student. Luckily the minister
intervened with some well chosen words from the Bible;
"Let he who is without Singh cast the first Stone!"
Fantastic. Here’s the second:
2) A scientist is working on a formula for immortality. So far, his most promising results
are from using an extract of the adrenal glands of seagulls, but it doesn't work on any
of the usual test animals like rats or monkeys, only porpoises, who show no signs of
aging whatsoever. When his supply source for seagull adrenal glands announces
they're no longer able to fulfill such orders, the scientist decides that, since he lives
near the ocean, he can just go catch some seagulls himself.
On his way back from a successful seagull-capturing expedition, he hears on his car
radio an announcement that a lion has escaped from a local zoo, but that the public
should not be alarmed, as this is a very tame lion. When the scientist returns to his lab,
he's amazed to find the lion fast asleep, lying across the doorway. He picks up his crate
of seagulls and carefully steps over the lion to go inside and phone the zoo. But instead
of zoo officials, the police show up to arrest the scientist. The charge? Transporting
gulls across a staid lion for immortal porpoises. 11

For clarity: the first joke puns upon the Biblical passage John 8:7 – “When they kept on questioning
him, he straightened up and said to them, 'Let any one of you who is without sin be the first to throw a
stone at her’” – and the second one plays off of the Mann Act, a piece of federal law in the United States
which ‘prohibits the transportation of women and girls across state lines for immoral purposes’.
11

53

Some Mechanisms of Humor

These jokes are not straightforwardly funny. (I write that they are not ‘straightforwardly’
funny, rather than that they are simply not funny, because, admittedly, they can gain a certain
second life through their very badness. They are so overladen that, paradoxically, they start to have
a certain zing. The fact that you can so clearly see the set-up laboriously creaking into place, adding
gratuitous and bizarre details so as to make the eventual pun work, might make them good
examples of a certain kind of meta- or anti-humor, wherein the joke is actually on the joke, or the
joke-teller, themselves. “See how terrible this joke is,” the message becomes; “laugh at my pitiful
attempt to make you laugh.” But I hope you will agree that, if these jokes are funny, their funniness
is of a second order – it is funny, we might say, that they are such poor examples of an endeavor
that has ‘being funny’ as its end. They are not funny in the way that a paradigmatically excellent
joke is funny.) And the reason they are not is because their punchlines do not ‘come out of
nowhere’ – they require us to accept, for the sake of the joke, an exhaustingly long list of unusual
details in the narrative. Before we get to the punchline, we have to deal with incongruity after
incongruity in the set-up. There is a failure, then, on the part of the joke’s congruous aspect, to be
sufficiently congruous. By comparison, a joke that sets itself up by describing a situation that is
highly recognizable, and has not stipulated many divergences from the normal way in which its
audience expects the world to work by the time it reaches its punchline, really hits: the punchline
is heightened because it emerges from somewhere completely believable.
Another phenomenon that we can explain if we stipulate that humor succeeds where there is
maximal congruity in its set-up is the success, and popularity, of observational comedy.
Observational comics present us with incongruities that are fairly tame, all things considered –
compared with the more outlandish hijinks depicted in most comedy, the quirks in everyday life
that, say, Peter Kay uncovers in his stand-up sets seem run-of-the-mill. That a person at a social
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event might dance, not only on the dancefloor, but also while walking from their seat to the
dancefloor, hardly goes against any sacred or unimpeachable social covenants. But since Kay
presents this image to us within a stand-up set in which he captures the feel of a lower-middleclass British wedding party with uncanny accuracy, and since he attributes the move to a
demographic for whom the shoe fits – a certain breed of male family elder really does do that odd
little walk-dance – the joke lands well. Kay front-loads his skit with so much relatability, so much
virtuous congruity, that he only has to conjure up a mildly incongruous image by the end to have
told a funny joke. Now recall that, if we were operating merely with the idea that incongruity is a
necessary condition for humor in mind, the case would be confusing: it would be difficult to
explain the popularity of Kay’s material, when his anecdotes involve only very mild incongruity.

A Notable Virtue of the Preceding Account
Before I move on to the ethical implications of the observations made in this chapter, I want to
draw attention to an important feature of the account of humor I have established here. It is worth
noting that I make no claims to the effect that any particular epistemic state is necessary, on the
part of any agent, in order for that agent to find any instance of humor funny. I think that this is a
significant virtue. As we saw when considering the shortcomings of the work of Niall Shanks and
Hugh Lafollette, claiming that finding joke J funny is iron-clad evidence that you have some
precise epistemic commitment C is always going to be a bit of a viper’s nest. Examples of humor
are prone to being multiply ambiguous, and it is almost always possible, for any given joke, that
some agent who is comically amused by it is comically amused in a way that is ironic (see Benatar
2016): laughing at a joke that mocks Scottish people, for example, because she, in fact, finds
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antagonism towards Scots to be so ridiculous that the playful adoption of that sentiment is
laughable to her.
But the bank of candidates for ideas that might be prescribed by a joke is not exhausted by a
single assertion (in the case that the joke is taken straightforwardly) and its opposite (in the case
that it is taken ironically). The thought processes that cause two people to be amused by a single
comedic performance will rarely be identical. Picture a character in a sitcom who loudly
admonishes her friend for behavior that she herself engaged in, earlier in the episode. I might find
this funny because the hypocrisy on show is so uncommonly blatant, and because I appreciate the
dramatic irony that stems from the fact that, unlike the rest of the cast, I am aware of how she has
acted that same day. But you are a bigger fan of the show than me, and your amusement is informed
by the fact that this outburst neatly encapsulates the character’s personality more generally. A third
person could pick up on the joke’s satirical commitments, seeing the character as a vector for white
liberals’ unwillingness to live up to their own ideals. Yet another might just like the odd cadence
in which the actor delivers the line. And if even two causal epistemic explanations are viable for
amusement at J, we will not be justified in claiming that J requires C in order to be funny. It is to
my theory’s credit that it does not involve any such claim.
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CHAPTER THREE – THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS THROUGH HUMOR

How Humor Can Manifest Bigotry
At last, we are in a position to answer the question posited in Chapter Two: why is a joke capable,
even in principle, of expressing a joker’s real view of the world? And, relatedly, how could a joke
possibly alter anyone else’s view of the world, so as to (for example) help spread some unflattering
stereotype about a group of people? Shouldn’t we expect jokes, given their unseriousness, to be
completely unrelated to agents’ sincerely-held worldviews?
The answer to this set of questions is that jokes interact with agents’ real views because
instances of humor depend, for their success, on their audiences’ expectations and perceptions of
what adheres to, or differs from, the norm. A joke has the greatest chance of causing comic
amusement when its set-up presents nothing that its audience considers to be incongruous, while
its punchline offers maximal perceived incongruity. 12 This observation is the starting point from
which we can begin to draw links between the humorous speech a person engages in and the real
beliefs they have about the world. An instance of humor is liable to be funny to people who hold
some set of epistemic items that allow them to perceive it as offering the right mix of congruous
and incongruous elements, and not funny to anyone who does not. Thus, a joke can be a genuine
manifestation of, say, anti-Catholic bigotry when an audience believing bigoted things about
Catholics is conducive to that audience perceiving the right things to be congruous or incongruous

Provided, that is, that the punchline adheres to the rules established in the set-up, and that the set-up and
punchline combine to form a coherent narrative.

12
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in order to find the joke funny, and when the joke-teller has told it because of just such an appeal
to anti-Catholic bigots. 13
Or think of the offensive race joke, referenced in this dissertation’s introduction, that Ted
Cohen cites:
How did a passerby stop a group of black men from committing a gang rape?
He threw them a basketball. (1999, 77)
There will be various different epistemic states a person could be in that would increase or
decrease the likelihood that they found this joke funny. But one of those states involves racist
beliefs: it will help a hearer to find the joke funny if they really believe in the stereotypes involved.
If you believe that it is largely true that black men are basketball-loving gang rapists, you will be
able to unpack the joke’s cognitive load quickly and easily. You can easily picture a group of black
men committing a gang rape – that seems comparatively unremarkable to you. You can also get
yourself to the point of picturing black men playing basketball without difficulty, since this is an
image that you are liable to call to mind when you think about black men. As such, you do not
need to imagine any unusual world when you hear the joke – the world depicted is more-or-less as
you imagine the real world. This allows you to focus immediately on one absurdity contained in
the joke: the incongruous idea of a group of people halting a gang rape – a monstrously violent
crime – to partake in a basketball game – a trivial recreational pursuit, typically requiring its
participants to be in a playful and social mode. In comparison, a right-thinking person would have
to go on more of a flight of fancy to appreciate the same incongruous turn of events. To enjoy this

A joke-teller’s reasons for telling a joke will almost always be over-determined. Thus, I do not require,
in order for a joke to count as a manifestation of bigotry, that its appeal to bigots is the sole determining
factor in the joker’s decision to tell it; merely that such an appeal is a contributing reason.

13
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absurd twist, she would first need to imagine a world in which two stereotypes about black men –
one more disgusting than the other, but each reductive and dismissive – are basically true. She
must already have entertained, for the sake of the joke, a world that is unlike the one she inhabits.
Thus, she cannot credit the joke-teller with the achievement of having coaxed a great incongruity
from an unassuming premise: she did some of the work herself. In this way, subscribing to racist
ideas can give one special access to the joke work involved here.
This is how humor can manifest bigotry: by being specially accessible to bigots, and by being
shared, at least in part, because of that special accessibility. If you and I are both fans of French
electronic music from the 2010s, we may send one another French 2010s electro records, and in
so doing, we may strengthen both our bond to one another, and our enthusiasm for the genre. I
could recommend an unreleased Martin Solveig mixtape, knowing that you’ll get a particular kick
out of it, and in response you tell me that, if I haven’t heard Madeon’s debut album Adventure, I’m
missing out. A similar bonding experience can play out if we are both racists, and share humor
that puts down members of an ethnic group we disdain. Our jokes can be accessed by non-racists,
but we each get a special kick out of it that grounds a feeling of fraternity between us, and a
newfound allegiance to our shared prejudice.
Cohen writes that finding the same jokes funny helps to build a certain intimacy between
people, because it demonstrates that we experience the world in similar ways (1999, 29). He writes
that, while agreeing about some fact is like agreeing that that “the coast of Maine in the summer
is characteristically a warm but not hot place, with a rockbound shoreline, often with mountains
nearby,” laughing at the same joke is more like a situation in which we both “find Maine in the
summer rather melancholy, with beauty no doubt, but a beauty that seems dim and fragile, and we
feel sweetly blue to be there.” (30) Shared amusement is sign of a personal connection.
59

The Communication of Ideas through Humor

Cohen is a little elliptical about what, precisely, grounds the intimacy that can result from a
shared sense of humor, but in this chapter and the previous one I take myself to have offered a
good deal more detail about that: we feel camaraderie with someone who laughs at the same gags
we do, because it can demonstrate that we have some shared sense of what counts as congruous
and incongruous. Cohen did not draw the conclusion that I have drawn, about a racist joke’s special
accessibility to racists – in fact, as we saw in this dissertation’s introduction, he expressed
scepticism about the possibility of explaining what is troubling about a racist joke at all (1999, 81).
But, with the acknowledgements of the previous chapter in place, we can see why a racist joke can
come to be the site of the intimacy Cohen talks about, between racists, and why this permits some
jokes to be manifestations or expressions of racism on some occasions.

A Worry
One worry you might have, when thinking about this explanation for how jokes can manifest
bigotry, is that it implies that bigoted joke-tellers must, themselves, have a rather sophisticated
appreciation of the inner workings of comic speech. Are these jokers supposed to understand that
comedy is about reaching the incongruous via the unremarkable? Are they seeking out fellow
bigots, knowing that their jokes’ blend of congruous and inconspicuous aspects will appeal to
them? Are they tweaking that formula and calculating how best to hone their material for a
prejudiced audience? If my theory requires that for jokes to be unacceptable on social grounds, it
will look as if very few jokes are going to be unacceptable at all, since it would be surprising if the
average white supremacist had such a well-developed theory of the nature of humor. Or, looking
at the worry from the other side: if we are to believe that this is something that happens between
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bigots regularly, we might start to wonder how interesting or worthwhile the present dissertation
can be, if I’ve been beaten to my understanding of bigoted jokes by the bigots themselves.
But my account requires no such thing. Jokers do not need to have an explicit idea of the
mechanisms of comedy in mind for their joke speech to make use of those mechanisms. It is likely
that you have a distinct sense of humor shared with a particular friend, or group of friends: you
have a good instinct for the kind of thing that will make your friend laugh, and the same is true for
them of you. It’s likely that you find sharing these kinds of jokes with that person or group to be a
distinctive pleasure, both because the jokes are tailored well to your tastes, and because engaging
in comic banter that is distinctly yours creates and maintains a rare kind of intimacy and fraternity
between you and your comic partner(s). But the precise nature of the parameters that determine
whether instances of humor will do well in the humorous framework you and your partner(s) have
established is probably not entirely obvious to you. (Even when we have been sharing a laugh with
a person for years, we can sometimes misjudge those parameters, and crack a joke that fails in
their presence.)
Me and my friend Iain enjoy a shared comic taste that is somewhat unlike that which I share
with anyone else I know. And I feel that I often know what would amuse Iain when I see it: a
certain comedy film strikes me as exactly the kind of thing he would love; a certain observation
occurs to me and know I ought to tell it to him; or something humorous happens, and I can work
on how to word the anecdote so that it would make Iain, in particular, laugh. The fact that he and
I have this keen comic understanding enriches our lives, and our mutual affection; but if you asked
me to articulate what we both find funny together in a general way – to tell you what, in principle,
Iain and I share a laugh at, and why – I would fail. I suppose I could point to some salient parts of
our shared history: the fact that we first watched British comedies The Office and I’m Alan
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Partridge together seems relevant, for example. So, too, does the fact that we met at a fairly rough,
working-class secondary school with a tendency to imbue its graduates with a penchant for gallows
humor. But these are gestures; I have no overall theory of what Iain and I laugh at, or why. This is
no impediment to either one of us making the other laugh, though: jokes that we would enjoy
together come to us, and we usually know them when we see them.
I am positing a similar phenomenon when it comes to racists enjoying jokes together, and those
shared laughs being, in some way, a celebration and reaffirmation of their racism. Bigoted jokers
do not need to know how Cohen’s ‘shared intimacy’ can be accrued, in order to experience it. They
do not need to be able to explain that a joke will tend to be funnier when its set-up strikes its
audience as unremarkable, and its punchline as outrageous, in order for their jokes to succeed
within that framework. I am referring, in this chapter, to work that goes on ‘behind the scenes’ of
joke-sharing – not, necessarily, to anything that the parties involved in joke-sharing will be aware
of themselves.

Ethical Upshots of the Manifestation of Bigotry in Humor
If a joke does manifest bigotry, one can call to mind why it may make the world a worse place, as
well as why it may reflect badly upon participants in its telling. Ideologically objectionable humor
can be a hindrance to the advance of egalitarianism, and can increase the vulnerability of
marginalized social groups to prejudice and alienation. Emrys Westacott (2012) summarizes this
point ably:
Humor of this sort is like pollution in the air: we all breathe it in. In some places it is more
concentrated, and here the effects are worse. Communities where crude antigay humor
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flourishes are more likely to see blatant prejudice and hostility directed against gays. But
everyone’s thinking is affected. Negative stereotypes can promote distrust, fear, anger,
contempt, dislike, or indifference directed toward those targeted. They can foster fear,
doubt, anxiety, and self-hatred in those being demeaned. And the telling and retelling of
jokes expressing prejudice conveys the message to anyone within earshot that such
prejudices are acceptable, as does the action of laughing at them. (183)
Bigoted jokes are capable of this because they can communicate prejudices on the part of joketellers, and display those joke-tellers’ willingness to express those prejudices, for the reasons I
have given above. If I trust your judgement enough, then hearing you tell a joke that I take to be
an expression of some sincere view will give me reason to take that view myself. Thus, for
example, a younger family member might develop sympathy for some political opinion when they
hear older relatives share a series of jokes that appear to support it. (Long before I had sophisticated
political opinions, or knew much at all about the conditions of life in 1980s Britain, I had developed
an antagonistic disposition towards Margaret Thatcher, on the basis of hearing adult acquaintances
tell jokes that were aggressively oppositional to her. I suspect that this is not an unusual source for
one’s initial opinion of a former head of state – in fact, I suspect that this might be one of the
primary means by which fledgling political or ideological views develop.)
Relatedly, bigoted jokes can play a backwards-facing ethical role, by revealing rotten attitudes
on the part of tellers and appreciators. If I drop a one-off gag about the Polish when you meet me,
you might assume that I was trying to break the ice with the first funny thing I could recall. But if
I launch into long, involved narrative bits about how shifty Poles are every time you see me, you
will, eventually, conclude that I do, in fact, despise the Polish. Westacott (2012) again: “The other
main reason for disapproving of sick or unsound humor concerns not its consequences but its
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source: those who traffic in it are thought to reveal some sort of failing within themselves.” (184)
This ethical result is unrelated to consequences – it is not that we are worried about what might
result from a bigoted joke here, but, instead, that we learn something ugly about the world (and,
specifically, about the joke’s teller) by virtue of hearing it.

Applying This Theoretical Work to Real-World Cases
What precedes explains how it is possible for humor to manifest, or express, an e.g. racist attitude
on the part of its teller, and appeal to a racist attitude on the part of its audience. Let us consider
what this means for the moral value of the behavior of joke-tellers. Regarding a joke-teller who
tells a joke with a potential special appeal to audiences with racist beliefs or attitudes, I will address
two possibilities: firstly, that the joker intends to communicate a racist message via the telling of
the joke; and secondly, that she has no such intention.
I do not mean to imply, incidentally, that this disjunction refers to a strict binary. Certainly
there is a range of possibilities regarding the intentions of anyone who tells a potentially racially
offensive joke, such that a large proportion of such instances will fall somewhere between those
that can be described straightforwardly as ‘a joker deliberately expressing a racist message’ and
those that can be described as ‘a joker merely attempting to be funny’. But I will consider these
two options for the sake of conceptual clarity, and allow my observations here to form parameters
for assessing offensive humor. In a case in which a joker has middling or unclear intentions, there
may be difficult questions to be answered about how much we should apply an assessment
appropriate to a maliciously racist joke-teller, versus that which would be appropriate for an
entirely well-meaning comic. But if we can draw well-justified conclusions about how to judge
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jokers at either extreme, we can at least provide a framework for a reasonable ethics of humor that
is sensitive to speakers’ intentions.
Note, also, that a joker’s intentions and attitudes are not always transparent, even to her. As
Carroll notes in ‘On Jokes’, “in matters like sexism and racism, we may not know all there is to
know about our own hearts.” As such, it is likely “that our own intentions and their background
conditions are generally obscure in [joking] matters, in part because what is involved in racism,
classism, and sexism is not yet completely understood.” (298) We should not necessarily assume,
then, that we can neatly describe even our own position in this spectrum of intentions when we
share humor. Still: it would be an exaggeration to say that we have no access whatsoever to our
intentions when we speak. We can have reasons, of greater and lesser strength, to believe that we
do or do not have innocent intentions in joking, just as we can have them when assessing the
intentions of other joke-tellers. The forthcoming normative conclusions about jokers in various
epistemic states can act as a useful guide on which to self-assess, based upon our best guesses
about how we feel about the targets of our jokes.

Regarding the Joker Who Means to Communicate Something Objectionable
If a joke-teller seeks to express some malicious, condemnable attitude through her joke, then the
humorousness of her speech does not directly affect its content in a morally important way. It may
affect contingent factors around how her speech will be received, which can have morally relevant
upshots – one may tell a racist joke because one knows that there is a social stigma attached to the
straightforward expression of one’s obviously racist views, for example – but the content of her
speech itself is not particular interesting qua humor ethics. When a joker has (e.g.) racist thoughts,
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and tells a joke to express those racist thoughts, and successfully communicates her racism to
others via the joke, we have a quite straightforward case of racist speech. We can condemn the
content of that speech in the same way that we would condemn a far-right activist speaking
hatefully from a soapbox – and a specific ethics of humor is not required to explain, or justify, that
condemnation.
This is an observation recognized by Steve Gimbel, in his book Isn’t That Clever. Gimbel
distinguishes ‘pure’ jokes from ‘impure’ jokes: pure jokes are told exclusively for the purpose of
raising comic amusement, while impure jokes are told, wholly or in part, for some other reason
(143). If, during a labor strike, an organizer tells a series of putdown jokes about the union’s
employer in an effort to galvanize the spirits of the workforce, her having a perlocutionary goal –
the rousing of her colleagues’ morale – means that she is an ‘impure’ joker. If a prisoner tells a
long-winded joke to some guards, intending to distract them while fellow inmates make their
escape, then, likewise, we are looking at a case of impure joking – a case in which the joker intends
to do something with her humorous speech other than merely causing amusement.
Gimbel dismisses impure jokes as irrelevant, as far as those of us concerned with envisioning
an ethics of humor should be concerned. Impure jokes can be judged according the ethical rules
already laid down for forms of behavior other than joke-telling. (Our ‘strike’ and ‘prison’ examples
likely feature actions of moral import, but investigations into the rights and wrongs of evading
justice or fighting for the working classes will tell us nothing salient about the nature of humor
ethics.) He writes:
If [a joke told to a man threatening suicide] was designed to see if you could actually get
him to jump to his death, that’s bad. A joke designed to cause harm should be judged like
all other actions that cause harm. Being an impure gag, that is, a joke with a perlocutionary
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goal other than demonstrating one’s cleverness, renders the gag a normal act to be morally
assessed in the usual fashion. (2018, 142) 14
Gimbel is right that the content of impure jokes can be assessed, ethically, like any other form
of behavior. But I do want to point out that, in presenting the dichotomy of joke-telling intention
the way that he does, Gimbel elides the question of why it’s possible for jokes to be impure in
certain ways – e.g. capable of expressing racist attitudes – in the first place. That question – how
can humorous speech express an attitude on the part of the speaker? – has been dealt with in this
and the previous chapter, and I will not spend any more time on it here, except to note that, in
merely presenting the existence of impure jokes without investigating it, Gimbel glosses over a
rather important question about humor ethics.

Regarding the Joker Who Does Not Mean to Communicate Something Objectionable
Having designated the moral status of impure jokes as being under the purview of non-humorspecific ethical theory, we are left with instances of offensive humor in which the speaker is not
trying to communicate any real attitude or belief they hold about the world: what Gimbel would
call ‘pure jokes’ (2018, 64).
Consider the moral controversy surrounding British comedian Jimmy Carr after he told the
following joke in his 2021 Netflix stand-up special, His Dark Material:

Gimbel writes about “demonstrating one’s cleverness” here because he has an idiosyncratic account of
what counts as an example of humor, involving the conspicuous demonstration of cleverness as a
necessary condition. I do not accept Gimbel’s account, but for present purposes it is no impediment: we
can think of ‘causing comic amusement’ as a substitute for ‘demonstrating cleverness’, and the moral
philosophy is not affected.
14
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When people talk about the Holocaust, they talk about the tragedy and horror of 6 million
Jewish lives being lost to the Nazi war machine. But they never mention the thousands of
Gypsies that were killed by the Nazis. No one ever wants to talk about that, because no one
ever wants to talk about the positives. (Khomami 2022)
Amongst moral critics of this joke in social and traditional media, one can easily find a flatfooted response, not unlike the rhetorical strategies adopted by Harold Schaitberger, and Dennis
Howitt and Kwame Owusu-Bempah, in Chapter Two of this dissertation. Critics have been keen
to paint Carr’s words as, variously, not a joke at all; or as an impure joke that really captures some
version of his genuine opinion about Romany Travelers. The Traveller Movement, a British charity
dedicated to defending and promoting the rights of Romany Gypsy, Irish Traveler, and Roma
people, described Carr’s material as “indistinguishable from the genuinely-held views of fascists
and Neo-Nazis,” and proposed that it amounted to “a celebration of genocide” (Action Storm
2022). Those in opposition to Carr’s words almost invariably put the word ‘joke’ in inverted
commas when referring to the passage – presumably implying that, even if it satisfies some
technical definition of joke speech, it nevertheless invokes some serious feeling on Carr’s part,
and was not issued solely with the intention of causing comic amusement.
I think that it is likely (and, in any event, at least plausible) that these depictions, in which Carr
harbors some serious antagonistic sentiment about Romany Travelers that found expression
through his joke, are false. Carr’s career has, for a long time, been built upon some fairly run-ofthe-mill observational comedy and punning one-liners, punctuated by the occasional
breathtakingly brutal put-down of a vulnerable group. Previous scandals surrounding his stand-up
content have concerned jokes told at the expense of children with Down’s Syndrome, Paralympic
athletes, and car crash victims (Groskop 2012). Given how regularly the comic returns to wince68
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inducing shock gags, and how heterogenous the marginalized groups who end up being his targets
are, it seems that he is motivated not by disdain for any particular group but by a fondness for
provocative punchlines – perhaps because he genuinely finds these kinds of gags funny, or perhaps
because he calculates that the resulting controversy will be good for his career. Those of us who
seek to offer moral criticism of his joke should not claim that he was really expressing a sincerelyheld prejudice, because in doing so we are likely describing the world inaccurately.
Anyway, making such claims seems unwise from the point of view of rhetorical strategy.
Consider a third party witnessing the argument surrounding Carr’s work, and attempting to assess
her own ethical liberties and responsibilities when it comes to joke-telling. Such a person might
well think: “Well, Jimmy Carr has certainly come in for some criticism following his joke about
Roma people. And, from the framing of that criticism, it seems that the issue is that he was, on
some level, venting his actual, pejorative feelings about the Traveler community through his
comedy. Introspecting, however, I can deduce to my own satisfaction that I, personally, hold no
antagonism towards the Roma – and, as such, I conclude that I ought to feel permitted to tell
whatever Holocaust joke about Travelers I want, given the absence of any actual bigotry on my
part.” This is presumably not the kind of assessment that The Traveller Movement, and other
parties critical of Carr, want to encourage.

The Academic Response to Potentially Objectionable Pure Jokers
We should accept that jokers who share comedy we find morally objectionable are not always
doing it out of genuine hatred or malice. And, plausibly, Jimmy Carr’s Romany Traveler joke does
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not manifest any of his real views about the world. But if that criticism is not available to those
offended by his joke, what should they say instead?
For his part, Gimbel proposes that, when we tell an edgy or risqué pure joke, we ought to be
aware of our context. Gimbel first acknowledges that pure jokes are playful, and then notes that
jokers can play “gently” or “roughly” with sensitive topics, depending on which particular jokes
they deploy (2018, 148). To demonstrate the distinction, Gimbel compares Mark Russell’s material
about George H. W. Bush with that of Bill Hicks. Russell took humorous shots at Bush that implied
that he was a boring Presidential candidate; Hicks referred to him, in a stand-up set, as a mass
murderer. Russell’s jokes, then, were comparatively gentle, and Hicks’ comparatively rough. It is
not always wrong to tell a rough joke, but we need to be aware of our context: different
environments can have thicker or thinner “play frames”, meaning that rough jokes are more or less
likely to be accepted by the people present. One ought to be careful that one’s jokes are not so
rough that they “outrun the insulation of the specific play frame” of the context in which they are
told – because, in such a scenario, we can foreseeably cause offense to our audience (2018, 150).
I have no objection to any of Gimbel’s foregoing advice: it all seems perfectly sensible. But
Gimbel has jumped the gun, and failed to answer a question about humor ethics that ought to be
dealt with before one starts offering advice about when and where to opt for ‘rougher’ or ‘gentler’
jokes. It strikes me that Gimbel is offering advice that leans towards the practical, while what is
required from humor ethicists here is theoretical. What I mean is that Carr – who, by hypothesis,
harbors no actual ill will against Romany Travelers – would be within his rights to ask why he has
to concern himself with roughness, and play frames, and context, whatsoever. After all, he could
point out, he does not mean what he says when he jokes about Roma people. So on what basis can
we demand that he holds himself to any ethical standards at all?
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After all, there are many examples in which agents do not mean what they say, and their speech
evades ethical criticism for precisely that reason. A courtroom stenographer, transcribing the
words of a ne’er-do-well, may write down some eye-wateringly objectionable claims; and she may
even be required to read her transcription out loud at some point. But she will not be asked to
morally justify or excuse the offensive things she has said, because it is understood that she is not
the author of the claims in the right sense. An actor may play a character who is a cruel bully, and
in so doing she might say demeaning and ugly things to the people around her. But she will not be
held responsible for her words either, because, while inhabiting her character, she is not expressing
her own views, but those of the fictional person she is depicting. Before we begin to advise pure
jokers about when and where they can joke about what, then, we ought to give an explanation for
why they are even ‘playing the ethical game’ in the first place – what differentiates them from an
actor or a stenographer, such that we do not apply moral rules to the speech of the latter two, but
do apply them to that of the former? If the roughness of a pure joker’s joke exceeds the play frame
she finds herself in, what, exactly, is the nature of her wrongdoing?

The Nature of Pure Jokers’ Potential Wrongdoing
The feature that distinguishes the speech of pure jokers from that of actors and stenographers,
making it so that pure jokers can be held morally accountable for their speech in a way that the
other two groups cannot, is that pure jokers are capable of exhibiting callousness through their
speech. I take an example of humor-sharing to be callous when, in telling the joke, the joke-teller
demonstrates that they have an inappropriately low regard for the reputation or wellbeing of the
group or person about whom they joke. To show callousness through humor, one does not need to
intend harm towards the target of one’s humor; nor does one need to hold any antagonistic attitude
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or disparaging belief about them; nor does one’s joke need to cause any actual harm. It is possible
to show that one places too low a value on a party’s reputation or wellbeing without one actively
wanting to do damage to their reputation or wellbeing. Likewise, one does not need to hold any
distinctive ill will towards the targeted party to be callous; it will often be the case that I feel
complete indifference, rather than enmity, towards a party about whose status I have an
inappropriately low regard. And what consequences my joke-telling has is distinct from the
question of how callous it was: I can demonstrate that I do not care enough about someone’s
reputation even if, in the end, I happen not to do any damage to it.
Here's how a joke like Carr’s can demonstrate callousness. We are supposing that, when he
told his Holocaust joke, Carr did not harbor any active prejudice against Romany Travelers – but
it is important to note that his audience does not necessarily know that this is the case. Because
jokes are non-assertive, there is almost always some level of ambiguity regarding what a joketeller really thinks about the target of her joke. It is possible (and anticipable) that some people
may interpret a joke that makes fun of Romany Travelers as expressing some version of a joker’s
real feelings about Romany Travelers; but also possible (and anticipable) that others may interpret
the joke as having been told purely for the purposes of comic amusement. In fact, with a big enough
audience, it becomes almost certain that some audience members will interpret such a joke as being
a deliberate and intended put-down, while some others take it to be an example of judgement-free
playfulness. (Carr’s popularity, along with the fact that he aired his special on Netflix, means that
his audience will almost certainly be of such a size.)
If I think that you are telling a joke at some party’s expense in order to express your real,
negative feelings about that party, then, if I have sufficient trust in your judgement, I am likely to
internalize some negative feeling about the party in question myself. Think, again, of the
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antagonistic attitude I developed in childhood towards Margaret Thatcher, by virtue of hearing
adults around me make jokes at her expense. I am an adult myself now, and my opinion of Baroness
Thatcher is not a million miles removed from where it was when I was 10; but, since I was not
engaging with anti-Thatcher ideology intellectually, it seems perfectly plausible that I could have
internalized some similarly malevolent feeling about Romany Travelers, if the adults around me
had been mocking Romany Travelers instead. 15 In a similar manner, if a member of Jimmy Carr’s
audience looks up to the comedian – thinks that he has a good understanding of the world; believes
that he ‘really tells it like it is’ – and also interprets him as saying some version of what he really
thinks through his joke, they are liable to internalize a disrespectful view of the value of Romany
Travelers’ lives, and of the extent to which the murder of Roma during the Holocaust was an
appalling tragedy. 16
Given the possibility of such a thing taking place, Carr’s use of a joke belittling the seriousness
and horror of Romany Travelers’ victimization by the Nazi Third Reich is a risky endeavor. And
the risk in question is not borne by the comedian, or by his audience: it is, instead, a risk to the
reputation of his joke’s targets. So, when he makes the joke, he shows a callousness towards
Travelers, by demonstrating that he is willing to gamble their reputation amongst his audience for
the sake of getting a laugh. Crucially, that goal – the goal of causing comic amusement – is
relatively trivial, and, in any case, multiply realizable: there are many ways for one to induce it. A
joke-teller – and certainly a joke-teller as professional and experienced as Carr – has access to a
Musical taste sometimes works this way, too: if your more musically knowledgeable friends are
constantly making fun of how lazy and pedestrian some new pop band is, you might be liable to adopt
that opinion, regardless of whether you have actually heard the band’s material.
16
I do not mean to suggest that many of Carr’s audience will instantly be convinced that ethnic cleansing
is what members of the Traveling community deserve. Instead, I mean that hearing his Holocaust joke,
and internalizing it in the way I have described, can contribute to a process through which one nurtures a
disrespectful view of Romany Travelers, via a process similar to that through which jokes can cause us to
form a negative opinion of a politician or musical act.
15
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multitude of jokes, one-liners, and funny anecdotes at any one time, which makes telling any
particular one a highly volitional act. When we consider the likelihood that some members of
Carr’s audience will be influenced to adopt a less sympathetic disposition towards Roma people
on the basis of enjoying his joke, along with the fact that he could have chosen instead to share
any number of alternative instances of comic speech, we can come to understand the joke as
sending a disrespectful message to, and about, members of the Traveling community. That
message is something like this: “I value the chance to amuse my audience sufficiently highly, and
the reputation and dignity of your ethnic group sufficiently little, that I am happy to take a gamble
in which what is at stake is how members of my audience think of you as a group, and in which
what I stand to win is a positive reception to an instance of humor. And I am happy to take that
gamble even though I don’t need to, because there are many other ways in which I could achieve
the same end.”
Let me reemphasize the moral relevance of the comedic options available to Carr, at the point
at which he made his Holocaust joke, via a contrastive, non-humorous example. When we speak
non-jokingly, it is also possible for us to be misinterpreted in such a way that members of our
audience internalize some insulting disposition towards a person or group – but, in most cases, we
would consider ourselves to be treated harshly if we were held morally responsible for that
misinterpretation. A governmental official may be called upon to report on national crime
statistics, and, while doing so, may explain that members of some ethnic minority group are
disproportionately involved in violent crime (as is sometimes the case for a complex set of social
reasons). In such a scenario, the speaker’s audience might misinterpret her speech as conveying
the message that members of the group in question are naturally inclined towards crime, rather
than subject to contingent, sociocultural conditions that make them likely to experience multiple
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deprivations with which being the victim, or perpetrator, of crime tends to correlate. Thus, her
speech risks the reputation of the group about whom she speaks; but, nevertheless, she is not
morally responsible for that risk. This is because of the constraints surrounding what she says: she
is required, on pain of obfuscating the facts, to say it. 17 Jokers do not operate under such
constraints: they could say many different things in an effort to attain comic amusement, which
makes any one particular piece of humorous speech the product of their own volition. Carr could
have avoided gambling with the reputation of Romany Travelers; but he did not.

Why Talking About ‘Callousness’ Is Necessary
If you’ll allow me to repeat myself for the purposes of clarity: the reason that we need to appeal to
callousness to explain the moral wrongdoing associated with so many instances of humor is that
we cannot make several other moral criticisms, which would often be the explanation of
wrongdoing in cases of bad non-humorous speech. Jokes do not straightforwardly express
propositions, and so we are not justified in directing moral criticism of the kind “You said that
[such-and-such an idea is true]” towards joke-tellers. Additionally, we are unlikely to be able to
say, of any joke, that its audience’s being amused by it demonstrates that they believe any such
proposition, because instances of humor can almost always be enjoyed on multiple different
interpretations, from multiple different epistemic positions. So, if we believe that ethical criticism
of joke-tellers are ever justified, we will require something short of these claims, which

It would also not need to be a person’s job to report these facts, in order for the constraints on her
speech to be morally relevant. One would, at the very least, be more permitted to mention them – even in
the face of the risk to the reputation of the ethnic group in question – in a serious informal discussion of
violent crime than in a joke-telling situation, because in such a discussion those statistics are relevant, and
one cannot achieve the ends of introducing them without mentioning them outright.

17
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nevertheless explains the possibility of wrongdoing on the part of a joke-teller. The charge of
callousness is just such a thing.

Conclusion
Ultimately, it is the fact that humorous speech is ambiguous – that it does not clearly indicate the
attitude and intentions of the speaker, at least not without significant additional, contextual
information – that gets pure jokers into trouble. What H. P. Grice would refer to as the speaker’s
meaning – the thing that the speaker wants the audience to believe, as a result of the audience
understanding her intentions and taking them as a reason to believe it (Vlach 1981, 359) – is often
unclear in, or absent from, cases of humorous speech. If jokes were straightforward, in the sense
that it was always obvious (or at least no less obvious than in standard cases of non-humorous
speech) how a speaker felt about the topic about which she was speaking, then we would have no
reason to condemn an innocent-minded joke-teller. Jokes would then carry no special likelihood
of misunderstanding, and a pure joker who made a Holocaust joke about Romany Travelers would
not be taking any special risk that members of her audience might internalize a disrespectful idea
about Romany people. We would have no right to call such a joker callous. It would still be
possible for members of her audience to misinterpret her as genuinely expressing a hateful attitude
towards Roma, but we would not be justified in holding her responsible for that possibility.
To sharpen this idea, think about the case involving Carr, and compare it to a case in which an
audience member misinterprets an instance of non-joking speech. Imagine, for example, that you
and I shared the following exchange:
You: Paul, do you know anybody from Edinburgh?
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Me: Only Stephen, a friend of a friend.
You: What’s Stephen like?
Me: Stephen’s awful. One of the most petty, self-involved, and insufferably boring people I’ve
ever met.
Imagine that, after this conversation, you mistakenly inferred that I was claiming that
everybody from Edinburgh was petty, self-involved, and boring. Suppose you then went about
your business believing that Edinburgers were like this, and allowed it to affect your behavior.
Planning a road trip around the British Isles, you dismiss Edinburgh as a potential stop out of hand;
introduced to citizens of Auld Reekie at a party, you give them short shrift. It would be
unreasonable, I think, to assign me any significant moral responsibility for your shabby treatment
of the city and its inhabitants in this case. It is true that your actions are a result of my speech – but
only after you have done some unpredictable interpretative work, which I cannot really have been
expected to account for during our initial conversation. Under normal circumstances, and provided
that a speaker has not done anything to make her intentions obscure, we do not hold her
accountable for her speech being misunderstood or poorly interpreted – nor for any resultant bad
behavior on the part of her audience.
Pure jokers who jokingly dismiss the badness of a genocide do not get off so easily, though,
and the reason for this is that their speech is foreseeably ambiguous. They have issued
communication that could reasonably be expected to lead people to believe that they really do not
respect the targeted group, and, as such, they cannot wash their hands of the likely consequences
of that interpretation. They ought to accept that their meaning is likely to be obscure to their
audience, and that, as such, they bear some responsibility for the comparatively wide range of
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mental states that their speech may bring about in their audience. It is this responsibility that
grounds the possibility that they may be acting callously, if one or some likely interpretations of
their speech are insidious enough, and if they take little enough care in dispelling those
interpretations when they joke.
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CHAPTER FOUR – SOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE ETHICS OF HUMOR

Introduction
In the remaining two chapters of my dissertation, I take note of some aspects of humor ethics that
do not emerge directly from the mechanisms of humor established in Chapter Two. In the previous
two chapters I drew upon observations about how humor works to build towards answers to some
fundamental questions about morality and joke-telling – questions regarding why it is possible for
an instance of humor to be morally wrong at all; why we ought to give a certain amount of ethical
leniency to speakers who talk humorously; and on what basis we are ever justified in believing a
joke to reveal the beliefs or attitudes of its teller. In Chapters Four and Five my approach is more
piecemeal: I am no longer building a general ethical theory of humorous speech, and am, instead,
interested in pointing out two morally relevant quirks of humor that have, thus far, gone
unobserved. In particular, the current chapter concerns the idea that a person’s social identity is
unusually important to the ethical value of her speech when she is joking.

The Importance of Social Identity to the Ethics of Humor
The observation that a speaker’s social identity makes some difference to the moral status of her
jokes is not new. An example often cited is a bit performed by Chris Rock in his 1996 HBO
television special, Bring the Pain. In this now-legendary passage, Rock draws a distinction
between well-behaved, respectable black Americans, on the one hand, and classless, undignified
black Americans on the other, referring to the former group as ‘black people’ and the latter by
using a racial slur. Reflecting on his hatred for the second group, Rock summarizes: “Boy, I wish
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they’d let me join the Ku Klux Klan. Shit, I’d do a drive-by from here to Brooklyn” (1996). It is
frequently noted – and it is surely true – that this bit is made acceptable only because Rock is
himself black. If, for instance, a white comedian was to have written and performed the piece, we
would be inclined, with justification, to condemn her for it. In the philosophical context, Carroll
has in various places observed that a potentially offensive joke about the Irish or Jewish will
trouble us less when told by Irish or Jewish people themselves (2001, 333-334; 2013).
I want to go a little further than this observation, however. I think we have reason to believe
not just that social identity matters morally in joke-telling, but that, typically speaking, it matters
in joke-telling more than it matters in cases of sincere speech. I want to say, in effect, that Rock’s
blackness differentiates him more from our hypothesized white comedian than it would have, if
both actors were speaking seriously. 18 Consider the following four scenarios:
a1) A person who you believe is not Jewish tells a joke which trades upon the idea that all
Jewish people are lazy criminals.
a2) Subsequent to the scenario depicted in a1), you discover that, in fact, the person who
told the joke is Jewish.
b1) A person who you believe is not Jewish says, sincerely and straightforwardly, that all
Jewish people are lazy criminals.
b2) Subsequent to the scenario depicted in b1), you discover that, in fact, the person who
made the statement is Jewish.

My claim is not that this will necessarily hold in every single case of a joke told by a group member,
versus the same joke in the mouth of an outsider. My claim is that a general rule of this kind holds: if we
are given very little information other than the speaker’s membership or non-membership of the group her
speech is about, we will typically have moral instincts of the kind I have described. I think Rock’s bit
follows this general rule; but I do not claim that no counter-example to it could ever be found.

18

80

Social Identity and the Ethics of Humor

My hypothesis is this: our discovery of the speaker’s Jewishness will typically cause us to more
radically revise our moral assessment of her behavior in a2) than in b2). Please note what I am
claiming here precisely. This is not simply a claim about the moral difference between saying
something negative about Jewish people jokingly and saying it non-jokingly. Nor is it simply a
claim about the moral difference between saying something negative about Jewish people when
you yourself are Jewish and saying the same thing when you are not Jewish. It is, instead, a higherorder observation, about the discrepancy between two discrepancies: I am claiming that the ethical
difference between the speech of Jew and Gentile is more pronounced, in the set of joking cases,
than in the set of sincere cases.
Allow me to give a little more detail about the reaction I anticipate to these cases. I think the
average person’s instincts with regards to the morality of each speech act will run as follows: b1)
contains the most straightforward case of wrongdoing of the four scenarios. We are looking at an
open-and-closed case of anti-Semitism, of the most traditional kind. b2), in comparison, is
confusing: it is difficult to make sense of what one has heard in the context of discovering that the
speaker is Jewish. In real-life circumstances, we might think that we initially misheard the speaker;
or that she was being ironic in a way that we failed to pick up on. These possibilities are ruled out
by the way that I have described b2), however: I have explicitly stipulated that our speaker is being
sincere, and that she actually said what it sounded like she said. Thus, we are forced to make a
moral assessment of a Jewish person who we know has sincerely said seriously negative things
about Jewish people. When forced to make this assessment, I think many of us will conclude that
the speaker has acted somewhat less badly than the speaker in b1) – we will think, perhaps, that
one has a sort of standing permission to say things about one’s own groups that one is not allowed
to say about other groups. But, on the other hand, it would not be bizarre to find someone who
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thought that the fact that the speaker is Jewish actually makes the situation worse, not better. This
is because the opinions we have about the characteristics of our own groups are perceived to come
from a place of epistemic privilege. Who knows more about Jewish persons than a Jewish person?
Thus, anti-Semites could have their hateful beliefs reinforced more strongly when they hear them
repeated by a Jewish person than, for example, by a Protestant. 19
The extent of the wrongdoing present in a1) will also be controversial, but, given what we have
observed in Chapter Two about the absence of literal assertion in joke speech, it is safe to conclude
that the speaker in a1) is doing something substantially less wrong than the speaker in b1). If you
say something that sounds like it might be bigotry, it is better, all else being equal, to have been
joking than to have been serious. And finally, and crucially, I find it difficult to motivate myself
to have any negative moral feeling about the speaker in a2) at all. Given the information available,
the Jewish person telling Jewish jokes seems unlikely to be an evil-doer of any stripe, and if one
initially felt uncomfortable having heard the joke in question, the identity of the speaker as Jewish
ought to have greatly settled one’s nerves.
So: The gap between the moral wrongdoing present in a1) and in a2) is bigger and more
obvious than the gap between b1) and b2). A joker who is not a member of the group she jokes
about might be doing something very nasty indeed; a joker who is a member of the targeted group
is almost certainly innocent. When the hateful speech is sincere, on the other hand, no such strong

We can see this kind of phenomenon posited in the critical response to statements that Kanye West
made in 2018, in which he dismissed slavery as ‘a choice’ made by black people in the USA. West is
himself a black American, and many of his detractors on social media have pointed out that, by placing
some of the blame for slavery on the shoulders of slaves, he was giving a gift to white supremacists who
would be able to use his blackness as a tool to promote their cause. Having someone who is himself black
dismiss the dehumanization and coercion involved in the American slave trade carries more weight, for
those who seek to popularize those views, than merely having them spoken by (yet another) white racist.

19
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presumption of blamelessness is granted to the speaker by virtue of her belonging to the targeted
group.

A Note About the Preceding Comparison of Cases
In the actual world, of course, complications abound. For any actual scenario in which we might
be interested in the moral value of some piece of speech, a description as brief as a1), a2), b1), or
b2) will be insufficiently detailed, and there are a great many incidental details that could
completely change our view of each set of circumstances if they were included. It matters, for
example, whether the speaker in a1) is a pure or impure joker: if we discovered that a non-Jewish
person was telling jokes with the serious intention of spreading suspicion and disrespect towards
Jewish people, for example, our assessment of her actions will now sit differently within the
context of our assessments of the other cases.
The possibility of additional details substantially altering our moral assessment of each speaker
does not, however, have any effect on how we intuitively feel about a situation where – as
stipulated – we do not know anything about the speaker other than that she is not Jewish and told
an unflattering joke about Jewish people. Nor does it show that there is anything wrong, because
unproductive, about examining cases that are pitched at this abstract level. My hypothesis is about
the relationship between social identity, ethics, and the presence or absence of humor – so it is
perfectly appropriate to consider cases in which only these factors are in play. A lack of detail in
our examples here can in fact help clarify things, rather than obscure them, since real-life cases
can have all sorts of details that are morally relevant but unhelpful for analytical purposes. As
mentioned in Chapter Three, it is possible to use the act of joke-telling to distract someone, or to
mask some other speech – and, depending on context, performing either such act could be an
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example of extreme bravery, or of abject maliciousness. But all this tells us very little – and nothing
of interest – about humor ethics.

Explaining Why Social Identity Is Unusually Morally Relevant in Humor
We can make sense of the idea that social identity has a greater moral relevance in humor-sharing
cases if we return, once again, to the fact that humorous speech gives rise to ambiguity regarding
one’s beliefs and motivations for speaking. When we joke, we play with ideas rather than propose
them outright. We might issue outrageous speech for its own sake, or entertain epistemic positions
we do not actually hold, because by doing so we can derive or provoke comic amusement. As
such, anyone observing our speech is less straightforwardly able to divine what we think and why
we spoke.
Now, in the cases we are currently considering, one conclusion that we have varying degrees
of justification for coming to is that the speaker genuinely believes that Jewish people are lazy and
criminal, and is trying to convince us of this. If this is the case, the speaker will be at moral fault
for the reasons that she a) believes anti-Semitic propositions, and b) is trying to get us to do so,
too. But, in at least some of the cases I have laid out, there are other possible explanatory and
motivational reasons for her speech – reasons that do not entail anti-Semitism and the associated
moral wrongdoing. So it is important, when we are making a moral assessment of the situation, to
have a view regarding what is likely to have motivated the speaker to speak, and what her likely
intentions were when she spoke.
I have observed that bigots sometimes express their hateful views through comedy, and
explained the process by which such a phenomenon can occur. It is worth recalling, however, that
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this is a matter of some controversy. We saw that a denial of any such possibility is implicit in the
ethical self-defences sometimes issued by comedians like Amy Schumer and Frankie Boyle. We
can also find it in John Morreall’s complaint about philosophers’ tendency to assume that agents
who joke about social group G harbor hostility towards members of G (2009, 98-100). In making
his point, Morreall states that “when one group hates another, they express their feelings in more
direct and damaging ways than by telling jokes” (2009, 99) – and, interpreted one way, this is
certainly true. Historically, we of course do see group prejudice manifest itself by means stronger
than mockery. But if Morreall intends this claim to be exclusive – that is, to mean that bigots resort
to strategies more harmful than jokes, and also do not resort to jokes – he is definitely wrong.
People do tell jokes about groups they have a distaste for, and their antagonistic attitude towards
the targeted group often explains the joke-telling. In his book The Rhetoric of Racist Humor, for
example, Simon Weaver cites a trove of jokes targeted towards black people that he found on a
series of white supremacist websites (2008, 76-77). In frequently using members of groups they
sincerely dislike as the subjects of jokes, though, our friends on the extreme right are not alone.
New York Yankees fans have reserves of quips about Boston Red Sox fans, and vice versa; men’s
rights activists are often the fall guys in the jokes of radical feminists, and vice versa; allied troops
would mock their Nazi counterparts in World War Two, and vice versa; and so on. I, personally,
spend much of my social time in the company of American liberals, and I have found that sincere
speech and humorous speech alike are laced with barbs about the more reactionary elements of the
Republican party. That this would be a coincidence is a long shot – it seems that we derive special
pleasure from jokes making fun of targets we believe are somehow worthy of derision.
So genuine anti-Semitism is a plausible explanation why a speaker might make a joke which
paints Jewish people in an unflattering light. But what are its rivals? Well, there are quite a few.
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The joke-teller could be trying to shock: outrageous or surprising speech commonly provokes
comic amusement, and the strong social conventions against speech that disparages sometimes
oppressed or hated groups make speech resembling it outrageous and surprising (see Smuts 2009a,
154). Alternately, she could be playing with acknowledged stereotypes. Benatar has noted that
humor based on negative stereotypes need not require an appreciative audience to believe that
those stereotypes are accurate: it can be found funny on the basis that the audience recognizes the
stereotypes, and understands that the joke alludes to them (2014, 30). Cohen refers to the epistemic
states that a teller and hearer must share to enjoy a particular joke as its “condition” – and, using
Cohen’s language, we might say that, while it’s possible for the condition of a stereotype joke to
be the belief that such-and-such a stereotype is true, it can also be merely the understanding that
such-and-such a stereotype exists (1999, 12). Consider the following gag, which I sourced from an
online repository of German humor:
Q: How many Germans does it take to change a light bulb?
A: One. We are very efficient and this is not a joke.
A joke of this sort can work, even if nobody in its audience actually believes that the
stereotypes of German productivity and humorlessness are accurate. Knowledge that those
commonplaces exist will typically suffice. 20
Finally, our joker may be making fun of anti-Semites themselves, rather than Jewish people:
the point of the joke could be something like “imagine how bizarre it would be if I actually held
this ridiculous opinion.” Straightforward sarcasm works in this way, but so, too, does a more

And, indeed, even that might not be necessary: thanks to the conversational rule of accommodation (see
Lewis 1979, 347), one’s audience might very well fill in the details necessary for the joke to work, even if
it has not previously heard of the existence of the stereotypes the joke makes use of.
20
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difficult-to-define sort of humor – a kind of giddy play-acting in which all involved parties
understand that they are saying egregious or nonsensical things without explicitly acknowledging
the fact. Academic philosophers sometimes do this in one another’s company, aping the recurring
tropes of essays they’ve marked in a deadpan manner: “Since the dawn of time philosophers have
wrestled with questions of morality, but my philosophy is that at the end of the day ethics is
subjective, so what is moral for you might not be moral for me. I just think we should live and let
live, you know?”
Anyway, what precedes is a few possible explanations for such a joke being told. Perhaps there
are others; but, due to the motivational ambiguity that accrues in cases of joke speech, there are
certainly several. Given this ambiguity, it makes sense for us to use what facts we know about the
speaker as clues to help us determine what has actually caused her to make her joke. Many such
facts might be relevant, like our having a long friendship with her, during which she has never
given any indication of antipathy towards persons of any particular faith – but in any event, and
especially if the speaker is a relative stranger, her being Jewish will be a highly reliable indication
that one of the less morally troubling potential explanations are probably in play. It won’t be a
guarantee, since members of in-groups can sometimes hold antagonistic views about their own
groups; but it will be a useful guide nevertheless. Overwhelmingly, Jewish people are not antiSemites.
Thus we can account for the intuitive difference in moral value between a1) and a2). That the
joker is Jewish in a2) decreases the relative probability of the reason for her telling a Jewish joke
being based in anti-Semitism, and increases the relative probability of each member of the set of
alternative explanations. When these alternative explanations obtain, the speaker is presumptively
innocent, and so we have reason to presume that the speaker in a2) is innocent. The joker in a1) is
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not Jewish – or we do not believe her to be Jewish – so this contextual clue, which would push us
towards thinking that she is innocent, is not available to us. The anti-Semitism-based explanation,
then, is still ‘live’. So our speaker in a2) gets a moral pass, and our speaker in a1) does not.
Now let’s apply the same idea to scenarios b1) and b2). What motivational or explanatory
reasons for the speaker’s speech might obtain in b1)? Once again, the speaker might really believe
that Jewish persons are lazy criminals, and be trying to convince her audience of this proposition.
But, unlike in a1), there are now few possible alternate explanations. After all, the speaker is – by
stipulation – being serious. So it is not possible that she is merely playing with stereotypes: one
does not play with stereotypes by straightforwardly proposing them. Nor is it possible that she is
being ironic or subversive. If she was being ironic or subversive, she’d be joking – and she’s not
joking. She could be trying to shock, although it is an open question whether saying something
outrageous and negative about Jewish people in order to shock is much more ethical than saying
it because you believe it. Either way, sitting atop the pile of possible explanations for her speech
is the possibility that she holds anti-Semitic views and is attempting to spread them. There is,
comparatively, little room for interpretation here.
Accordingly, in b2), the introduction of the speaker’s membership of the social group ‘Jewish’
is of comparatively little use as a contextual clue. We have quite few interpretations of what’s
going on to choose between, and one – genuine antagonism towards Jewish people – is far and
away the most viable, so being given a piece of information that would otherwise suggest that the
speaker is unlikely to hate Jewish people does not tip the scales towards the innocent explanations
in the way that it did in a2). Jewish anti-Semites are rare, but, other possibilities being thin on the
ground, that remains the most plausible explanation of what’s going on. It stands to reason, then,
that finding out that a person is Jewish would make relatively little difference to our moral
88

Social Identity and the Ethics of Humor

assessment of her speech when she is saying bad things about Jewish people sincerely, rather than
jokingly. As such, the use of social group membership as a contextual clue when we are trying to
identify a speaker’s reasons for speaking helps us to account for the larger intuitive moral gap
between a1) and a2) than between b1) and b2). 21

Sections of this chapter have previously appeared in my article “Focusing on the Gap” (Butterfield
2022).
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CHAPTER FIVE – COMEDIC HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE

Introduction
Thus far in this dissertation, I have made claims about humor ethics that are, first and foremost,
focused on the potential for the content of an instance of humor to be morally objectionable or praiseworthy. But this does not exhaust the means by which ethics can interact with humor. There
are ethical considerations to be addressed on the subject of which particular instances of humor
come to be found funny (or unfunny) by their audiences, and, relatedly, which particular joketellers come to have a reputation for being witty (or dull). The boons and harms that can be brought
about by comic expression apply not only to those who are the subjects of jokes, but also to joketellers themselves. For reasons that will be addressed later in this chapter, being able to comically
amuse others is socially valuable. And given that this is the case, the matter of who gets to
comically amuse, and to be perceived as comically amusing, is a matter that intersects with
concerns for justice and fairness. Within this chapter I outline the process by which the likelihood
of being found funny can be affected by one’s social identity, and the privileges and disadvantages
one experiences as a result of that identity.
In particular, I posit the existence of comedic hermeneutical injustice – a type of hermeneutical
injustice that disadvantages members of marginalized groups in the arena of humor-sharing. First
I explain the concept of comedic hermeneutical injustice: that agents who are hermeneutically
marginalized are less able to successfully participate in the sharing of humor. I then suggest that,
to prove the existence of such an injustice, two things need to be shown: firstly, that
hermeneutically marginalized groups do suffer some disadvantage in how well their attempts at
humor are received; and, secondly, that this disadvantage amounts to a significant harm.
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In proving the existence of a comedic disadvantage, I note that all jokes require some epistemic
content to be shared between joke-teller and joke-hearer. Thus, since being hermeneutically
marginalized obstructs one from sharing knowledge with proximate speakers, hermeneutical
inequalities can lead to inequalities in the sharing of humor. To show that this constitutes a
significant disadvantage, I observe the various ways that sharing humor successfully can serve
agents’ social interests. I conclude by noting some idiosyncrasies of comedic hermeneutical
injustice, relative to other forms of epistemic injustice, and situating it within the wider framework
of humor’s general social-ethical influence.

The Concept of Comedic Hermeneutical Injustice
Comedic hermeneutical injustice occurs when a person is rendered less able to speak (or write,
perform etc.) humorously and have people find what they say amusing because the concepts they
are appealing to are not well understood by others, where the reason for that failure to understand
is that the experiences of a social group the speaker belongs to are afforded restricted opportunities
for expression within the wider culture of the speaker’s audience. This form of hermeneutical
injustice will occur, for instance, when a joke that makes reference to the details of one’s cultural
celebrations goes over the head of one’s audience, whereas a similar joke about a hermeneutically
dominant group’s celebrations would have been understood and appreciated. It will occur when a
stand-up comic’s observation about the experience of being a member of an ethnic minority is
poorly received by her ethnic majority audience, as a result of a disproportionate lack of visibility
of members of her ethnic group within popular culture. And it will occur when a member of a
workplace is perceived as boring or humorless by her colleagues because she is unable to make
jokes that are understandable from their hermeneutically dominant point of view.
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Throughout this chapter I will mirror the terminology employed by Miranda Fricker in her
discussion of standard cases of epistemic injustice (2007, 17) by referring to the extent to which
one is perceived as funny – as capable of producing, replicating and appreciating good comedy –
as the level of comedic credibility one is afforded by others. Those who are unfairly perceived as
unfunny as an upshot of hermeneutical injustice will, accordingly, be considered to suffer from a
comedic credibility deficit. This terminology can appropriately cover the experience of being
found unfunny at the moment at which an agent fails to elicit comic amusement from her audience
– “this joke, currently being told, is not funny” – but can also refer to the forward-facing harm of
being considered unfunny over a longer period of time (including moments in which one is not
actively trying to amuse) – “you are not a funny person”.

The Influence of Hermeneutical Marginalization on the Sharing of Humor
To show that comedic hermeneutical injustice can take place, I will need to show a) that members
of hermeneutically marginalized groups will at least sometimes be made less able to speak or act
humorously, or have their humorous speech or action meet the intended reaction, by virtue of their
hermeneutical marginalization, and b) that this constitutes some substantial disadvantage to them.
In order to demonstrate, first, that hermeneutical marginalization can render people unable to share
humor and have it be found humorous, it is necessary to briefly return to some philosophical
definitions of the comic.
In Chapter Two we observed that playing with our perceptions of what is normal or irregular
is an essential component of comedy. It follows from this observation that, for you and I to enjoy
humor together, we will need to share some expectations, beliefs, or attitudes about the world. In
order to jointly perceive an occurrence as going against the way things normally are, and,
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accordingly, finding it funny together, we will need to agree, to some extent, about how things
normally are. Now: when one’s experiences are not expressed or shared widely amongst other
members of one’s society, one’s experiences will not contribute in a significant way to the
collective pool of references that accessible instances of humor in that society can be based on.
That is to say: features of one’s experience, tending not to be represented in the art, media or
academia that most people consume, will make for jokes that are not understood by most people.
Hermeneutical marginalization leaves its victims at the margins of popular culture, unable to
significantly influence the ways in which the people around them understand the world and express
themselves. And – since jokes make reference to knowledge, understandings, or attitudes that (in
successful cases) are shared between tellers and audiences – suffering from this disadvantage
leaves one at an additional disadvantage when it comes to crafting humor: one’s own experiences
become obscure, and therefore less valuable as a reference point for joke-telling. To state the
obvious: if the condition of getting a joke is understanding what it is like to be me, and you have
not been made familiar with what it is like to be me, you will not get the joke.
The experiences of some groups are reflected back at us so often that they become familiar,
even to people who are not members of those groups. It is partially because of the ways in which
whiteness, for example, imposes itself upon the epistemic sets of members of other racial groups
that W. E. B. Du Bois famously wrote, “Of [white people] I am singularly clairvoyant” (2012, 73):
knowledgeable about the privileged group in a way that is not broadly reciprocated. In her book
Visual and Other Pleasures, Laura Mulvey considers the frequency with which women must put
themselves in the shoes of male protagonists when consuming film, and notes that “the woman
spectator in the cinema can make use of an age-old cultural tradition adapting her to this
convention, which eases a transition out of her own sex into another” (32). The requirement for
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empathy with male heroes is so ubiquitous, for cinema-goers of any gender, that imaginatively
perceiving the world from the perspective of a man becomes familiar territory for women. And the
likelihood that agents from all social groups will have extensive second-hand experience of the
perspectives of white people, or of men, increases the general propensity for understanding a joke,
when it is made by a white person and/or a man.
So we can see that members of some social groups will tend to have knowledge and
experiences that are comparatively ‘mainstream’, in that they are better understood by their
society, taken as a whole, while members of other groups will have knowledge and experiences
that are relatively ‘niche’, meaning that fewer participants in their society will be familiar with
their points of reference. This lack of shared knowledge will allow them fewer opportunities than
their better-understood counterparts to make jokes that most people will get, which can, in turn,
lead to members of hermeneutically marginalized groups receiving unfairly low comedic
credibility ratings. Faced with a conversational partner who makes jokes that we do not find funny
(or, perhaps, even recognize as jokes), some of us may be self-reflective enough to understand that
our own ignorance could be contributing to the failure of the jokes to land; and, furthermore, we
may be charitable enough to believe that the person we are speaking with would make us laugh, if
we understood their experience of the world more fully. In this case, comedic hermeneutical
injustice can still occur, since the value of sharing humor lies not only in being perceived by others
as funny, but also in the pleasure we can find in actually bringing about comic amusement in
others. However, on occasions in which we are less charitable and self-reflective, the injustice can
be worse. Another conclusion we might come to, when we do not find someone’s jokes funny, is
that they are simply not funny – not talented when it comes to sharing humor. In this case, a
hermeneutically marginalized agent is subject to an unfairly negative judgement about their
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attributes as a person – a further injustice on top of the disadvantage they are at when they share
humor with a general audience in the first instance. Since both deny victims some of the benefits
of humor-sharing, and both result from unequally distributed hermeneutical resources, the deficit
in one’s chances of amusing one’s audience and the unfairly low comedic credibility rating are
both individually sufficient for comedic hermeneutical injustice to obtain.
This, then, is the answer to the challenge of demonstrating that disadvantages in hermeneutical
resources can lead to disadvantages in sharing humor. The conditionality of jokes – the
requirement for a joke-hearer to understand something in common with a joke-teller – means that
any factor that limits the likelihood that one will share knowledge with the majority of other people
within one’s society will, at the same time, limit one’s opportunities for the successful sharing of
humor with other people. Furthermore, where those limitations have their roots in unjust social
structures, the limitations themselves will count as unjust for that reason. And, of course,
hermeneutical marginalization has exactly this kind of limiting effect, since it takes the power to
influence how people perceive and understand the world away from members of particular social
groups.

Comedic Hermeneutical Injustice in Practice
Of course, in any specific example in which an instance of humor fails to cause amusement, the
source of that failure will be over-determined. In previous chapters we have considered the fact
that that humorous speech is issued, and enjoyed, for reasons that can be ambiguous – and this
makes it difficult to say definitively, of any particular joke, that it failed as a result of hermeneutical
marginalization and hermeneutical marginalization alone. In what follows, however, I will address
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two real-life scenarios in which there is good reason to believe that comedic hermeneutical
injustice has worked against a joke-teller or -tellers.
In the Hari Kondabolu-produced documentary The Problem with Apu, comedian and actor
Aasif Mandvi discusses the limited and stereotype-heavy cultural representation of IndianAmericans within the USA. Mandvi notes, in particular, that regressive and one-dimensional
characters like The Simpsons’ Apu have a freezing effect on the ability of South Asian American
comic entertainers to express themselves. Because The Simpsons debuted at a time when there
were few South Asian American characters in popular fiction, Apu’s particularities had an outsized
effect on how South Asian people came to be perceived in the United States. And because Apu is
a comedy character specifically, he cast a long shadow over the ways in which American audiences
were willing to perceive South Asian performers as humorous. Mandvi observes that the character
of Apu “lives in a systemic culture of, how are South Asians represented? If we’re funny just
because of an accent, and if that’s the only version of us that’s seen...the audience will only accept
one version of South Asians. They won’t accept something that’s nuanced or too complicated”
(2017). Were South Asian people more thoroughly represented, as a group, within the culture of
the United States, South Asian American comedians and comic actors would have a greater set of
options available to them when it came to setting up jokes – and, perhaps, would also enjoy a
greater willingness, on the part of their audiences, to entertain the states of mind required to enjoy
their jokes.
Elsewhere, comic performers who face the prospect of comedic misfires as a result of
hermeneutical injustice may alter their performances to avoid them. In a 2016 analysis of the
material of comedian Julie Goldman, Corrine Seals compares a series of Goldman’s jokes on the
television show The Big Gay Sketch Show, which is performed live in front of an audience and
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involves improvisation, with similar content from some of her stand-up performances. Notably,
the television show could count on an audience that included a large number of members of the
LGBTQ community, and people interested in topics related to LGBTQ identity; in contrast,
Goldman’s performances in comedy clubs took place in front of more general audiences, who were
not reliably so interested and who did not necessarily know that they were going to see a
performance by a lesbian comedian (99). Seals describes a number of divergences between what
happens in the two contexts that can likely be attributed to the second group of audiences’ lack of
familiarity with LGBTQ tropes and references. First, she notes that Goldman “explicitly spells out
her identity for the general audience, recognizing through double consciousness that this audience
may not pick up on subtle aspects of her identity presentation,” by “refer[ring] to herself as a
“butch lez” multiple times, something she never once does for the LGBT audience” (103). Seals
then identifies the audience as missing a joke when Goldman goes on to describe butch lesbians
as ‘shy’ and ‘sensitive’, suggesting that an audience consisting primarily of members of the
LGBTQ community would recognize that, in saying this, she is disclosing what is perceived to be
a profound and compromising secret. Finally, when Goldman relays an anecdote about a
(presumed straight) store assistant viewing her as sexual or romantic competition, Seals writes that
the general audience fails to pick on the satirical nod to heteronormativity in the story – and,
accordingly, they “do not laugh through this entire set of lines, whereas this would likely be
material at which her LGBT audience would laugh heartily” (104).
Thinking about Seals’ comparison cases with hermeneutical justice in mind, we are able to say
that Goldman’s job as a comedian is made more difficult as a result of hermeneutical
marginalization. Had Goldman’s sexuality placed her in a social group that was not
hermeneutically marginalized – were she, for example, a straight man – she would not need to
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alter her performances to make aspects of her identity salient, and she would be less likely to miss
out on audience reactions as a result of a loss of understanding when moving from an audience of
people like her to one with a non-specific demographic.
With all that we have observed about the link between success in humor and hermeneutical
privilege in mind, it is unsurprising that myths about marginalized groups being humorless abound
in popular discourse. Feminist scholars have noted the pernicious staying power of the idea that
women just ‘aren’t funny’ – and, in particular, that politically engaged, feminist women are
incapable of detecting or enjoying humor (Douglas 2010, 662; Willett and Willett 2019, 21). In
her analysis of Goldman’s work, Seals also opens up her focus to reflect upon the stereotype of
lesbians as lacking a sense of humor (2016, 97). Meanwhile, British Muslim humorists have
reported feeling out of place in the country’s prevailing comedic culture (Glubb 2019; Khan 2007;
Syed 2019): Muslim stand-up comic Jeff Mizra, for example, describes a prevailing perception,
amongst those who first hear about his religious identity and occupation, that the two are in some
kind of logical tension (Khan 2007). There is evidence that similar ideas are present in many parts
of the world in which Muslims are a minority population (Amarasingam 2010, 473-474; Zimbardo
2014, 60). Presumably the sense of contradiction that Mizra brings to light stems from an
association of Muslims primarily with non-humorous modes of cognition and communication –
and it seems likely that the popularity of this view is exacerbated by an under-representation of
Muslim voices, in places where other religious identities are demographically predominant,
amongst the hermeneutical sources from which comedy can draw its references.
The stereotypes I mention here will no doubt also have sources in unrelated prejudices. As
Mizra mentions, the perception of Muslims as not given to humorous talk is wrapped up with
broader preconceptions that characterize Islam as an uncommonly strict form of religious
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affiliation (Khan 2007). Elsewhere, the prevalence of misogynistic humor, and the attendant need
for feminist writers to analyze comedic output with a critical eye, is clearly part of the genesis of
the ‘women-don’t-like-a-joke’ trope. Evidently, though, what a worldview that makes reference
to comedic hermeneutical injustice would predict about assignations of comedic credibility is
borne out by real-world observation: audiences are routinely surprised by, and dismissive of,
comedy that comes from members of groups that are afforded limited opportunity to contribute to
the collective pool of hermeneutical resources.

What’s the Difference between Comedic Hermeneutical Injustice and Just Being Too
Arch?
Of course, it should be possible for a person to fail to be funny, and for that failure to be unrelated
to any form of injustice. Thus far I have focused on the experience of having one’s jokes not be
appreciated by one’s audience, because one’s points of reference are specific to groups whose
perspectives are not well understood, as a potential example of comedic hermeneutical injustice.
A concern might arise, when we think of examples like this, regarding how to delineate such cases
from cases in which a joker is just not very funny. Ultimately, the harm that a victim of comedic
hermeneutical injustice suffers is the harm of not being found funny (along with the denial of some
attendant goods, such as having others enjoy being in one’s company, that I will consider in the
following section). But nobody simply has a right to be found funny even when they lack a talent
for comic expression, and it would be a problem if my account ended up declaring (almost) any
case in which a speaker tries and fails to comically amuse her audience as a case of wrongful harm.
So what is the difference between a scenario in which Agent A tells a joke, fails to elicit amusement
from the people around her, and is thought to be a dullard as a result of comedic hermeneutical
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injustice, and one in which Agent B goes through the same experience, but is not thereby a victim
of any injustice?
Before I offer an answer to this question, let us further blur the lines between the two scenarios
by stipulating that the reason B doesn’t make her audience laugh is because its members lacked
some knowledge that was crucial to one’s enjoying the joke. B made a quip about professional
wrestling, let’s say, and it was tremendously witty – but to get it, you really needed to know your
full nelsons from your overhead wristlocks, and B’s audience did not. In contrast, if B had dropped
a similar line about a comparatively mainstream sport, she would have brought the house down.
In such a case, we could certainly say that B belongs to a group – wrestling fans – whose
experiences are too niche to penetrate the popular consciousness, and we could attribute her lack
of success in joke-telling to that nicheness. So how are we to maintain that comedic hermeneutical
injustice obtains in some cases, without overstepping the line and saying that anyone who, like B,
trades in too-obscure reference humor is a victim of it?
We do so by requiring hermeneutical marginalization to be part of the causal story of any case
of comedic hermeneutical injustice. This requirement mirrors a distinction that Fricker notes, in
Epistemic Injustice, between cases that do and do not count as examples of hermeneutical injustice
generally. In that text, Fricker considers the case of a woman named Wendy Sandford, who
suffered from post-natal depression in the 1960s but, thanks in part to a poor societal understanding
of women’s reproductive health, could not recognize herself as a sufferer of that condition.
Sandford only came to think of her experience as one of ‘post-natal depression’ after attending a
feminist consciousness-raising event at MIT. Says Fricker of Sandford’s story:
Here is a story of revelation concerning an experience of female depression, previously illunderstood by the subject herself, because collectively ill-understood. No doubt there is a
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range of historical-cultural factors that might help explain this particular lack of
understanding…but in so far as significant among these explanatory factors is some sort
of social unfairness, such as a structural inequality of power between men and women,
then Wendy Sanford’s moment of truth seems to be not simply a hermeneutical
breakthrough for her and for the other women present, but also a moment in which some
kind of epistemic injustice is overcome. (2007, 149)
Another case found in Epistemic Injustice is the harm caused to Carmita Wood by virtue of a
lack of a popularly understood term for sexual harassment at a time at which she was a victim of
it (149-151). Wood suffers harm that is additional to the harassment when, for example, she seeks
unemployment benefits but is unable to properly articulate the experiences that led to her leaving
her job. Turning her attention to why Wood suffers from hermeneutical injustice in this case, but
her harasser does not, Fricker locates the difference in the fact that the harasser’s inability to
comprehend the idea of sexual harassment “is not a significant disadvantage to him”, while,
clearly, it is a significant disadvantage to her (151).
What is important to note, for current purposes, is that these cases concern victims of injustice
who are made worse off, ultimately, as a result of uneven social power dynamics and
marginalization. Their victims can point to unjust social conditions experienced by members of
some demographic to which they belong, as part of the causal story of their failure to make
themselves understood, either to other people with whom they have an interest in communicating,
or to themselves. They are not, then, merely victims of bad luck, whose lived experience just so
happens to be inaccessible at the time and place in which they are alive; that inaccessibility is,
instead, a consequence of the structural oppression or marginalization of people like them. Fricker
contrasts these cases with one in which a person has a medical condition that is poorly understood
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during her lifetime, and who endures prolonged and intense ill health as a result (152). We may
have great sympathy for the agent in this example, but, since the harm she suffers is a result of
happenstance rather than inequities in the social structures to which she is subject, we cannot
properly attribute hermeneutical injustice in this case. 22
The answer to the question of how to distinguish victims of comedic hermeneutical injustice
from the merely unfunny involves an appeal to the same requirement. Comedic hermeneutical
injustice piggybacks on what Robin Tapley, in humor ethics-related discussion, refers to as “social
disparity” (2005, 185). A joker whose humorous speech goes unappreciated because her group
culture is marginalized or ‘othered’ suffers from it; but one who merely has niche interests, so that
her points of reference fail to achieve significant uptake while serving as conditions of her jokes,
does not. And, once again, we might feel bad for this second kind of joker: she may play two
observations about stamp collecting off against each other very skillfully, and it may be a pity that
nobody in earshot could appreciate her wit. We can even believe that the world would be a better
place if people generally were more well-versed in the topic about which she jokes, as when the
joke in question is about some edifying philosophical topic; but when one talks about comedic
hermeneutical injustice, one is talking about quite a specific type of phenomenon – and it is one
that requires uneven power structures as part of the causal explanation for a lack of comic
amusement on the part of an agent’s audience.
It is also worth emphasizing the need for hermeneutical marginalization, specifically, to be
present in a case in which comedic hermeneutical injustice obtains. A race or gender of people

Of course, we can imagine a scenario in which a person may suffer harms of the sort just described,
except that that harm does obtain because of the fact that she belongs to a social group whose members
tend to lack power and recognition, relative to other, comparable groups. But Fricker’s description of the
case in question certainly does not require any such detail.
22
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may face a number of obstructions on the path to comic success, but those obstructions may be the
consequences of (e.g.) explicit bigotry, and not the fact that the experiences of their members are
poorly represented. An East Asian American comedian may not be booked by the promoter of a
comedy club, on the basis of a belief on the part of the promoter that Asian entertainers are not
marketable. Or she may be heckled or ignored by a hateful crowd who are openly hostile towards
her, on the basis of explicit and consciously-held bigotry. In both cases the comedian suffers racial
injustice, and the injustice manifests itself (amongst other ways) in an inability to meet with
success in the sharing of humor, where a comedian with a different racial identity would succeed.
But neither case involves comedic hermeneutical injustice, because each case results from directly
discriminatory beliefs and behavior, as opposed to a lack of hermeneutical resources on the part of
the marginalized group in question.

The Seriousness of Comedic Hermeneutical Injustice
I am now left with the second point to prove in order to demonstrate that comedic hermeneutical
injustice is a genuine form of epistemic injustice: that being less able to share humor successfully
amounts to suffering from a genuine and substantial disadvantage. How harmful is it to experience
a comedic credibility deficit?
There is a case to be made for the idea that the typical agent who suffers from a comedic
credibility deficit endures something less distressing than the typical agent who suffers a credibility
deficit in her capacity as a knower. This is because, for example, one’s perceived competence as a
knower may strike us as a trait more closely linked to career progression, at least in most
professions, than humorousness. Likewise, it is probably more unusual to hear someone’s friend
or partner describe them as stupid than as unamusing. For current purposes, I do not need – nor do
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I intend – to argue that the median comedic credibility deficit is as harmful (or more so) than its
counterpart for non-comedic credibility deficits.
I do hold, however, that comedic credibility deficits are not trivial. Even if it is not as closely
linked to our respect for others as knowledge, humor is still one of the means by which we judge
our compatibility with other people: think, for example, of the propensity for profiles on dating
websites to list a “good sense of humor” as a major desirable trait in a romantic or sexual partner;
or of the high proportion of people who would list being funny amongst their friends or partners’
positive qualities. Think, also, of how successful use of humor correlates with our perceptions of
figures in the public eye as likeable and trustworthy; and, conversely, how a perceived lack of
sensitivity to comedy can make one appear out-of-touch or lacking in character. Evidence of this
can be seen in the way that Barack Obama was praised, during his time as U.S. President, for using
humor to deliver political messages to a wide and general audience; and, in the UK, in the way
former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn was criticized by political analysts for coming across as
humorless (Heil 2016; Sinclair 2015). Analyses of politicians’ credentials as comedic orators are
common because humor is an important factor in how we relate to, and identify with, other people,
and how effectively they can communicate their ideas with us. The fact that politicians are liable
to be criticized for lacking a sense of humor indicates that the ability to tell and appreciate jokes
is seen as an indicator of one’s competence in other important areas of life. An agent who receives
a low comedic credibility rating will, therefore, be judged to be lacking across a range of attributes
that are valued socially.
However, even if it wasn’t the case that being perceived as unfunny can bleed into other
negative assessments of one’s character – such as that one is untrustworthy, boring or unintelligent
– it would still be a damaging perception on its own. Given the value that most of us place on
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interacting with other people who can make us laugh, most situations in which developing positive
relationships with those around us is in our interests will be situations in which it is good for us to
come across as funny. In some cases being liked by others is an instrumental good, such as when
acquaintances are in a position to facilitate progression in our career; but developing positive
relationships with others is a good in itself, which is conducive to leading a flourishing life. And
finally, at the most basic level, it is simply a nice thing to be thought of as funny. It is pleasant to
make people laugh, and it’s pleasant to have a reputation for making people laugh. Not
experiencing that pleasure is, on its own, hardly a disaster, but it is nevertheless a disadvantage in
its own right.

A Unique Feature of Comedic Hermeneutical Injustice Amongst Forms of Hermeneutical
Injustice
So we have good all-things-considered reasons to believe that comedic hermeneutical injustice
takes place, and that it can constitute a significant harm to those who suffer it. Further to this,
though, there is one sense in which the stakes are actually higher, in cases of hermeneutical
injustice regarding humorous speech, than in cases of hermeneutical injustice regarding nonhumorous speech. That sense is this: in the case of humorous speech, misunderstandings that are
based upon a lack of shared hermeneutical resources cannot fully be put right. To see why this is,
consider the following: when I make a sincere proposition which makes reference to some fact or
feature of my experience that you are unaware of, it is open to me simply to explain what it is that
you fail to understand. Then, once I have shared the relevant information, you will be in a position
to assent to the claim that you previously could not assent to (provided that I am correct, or at least
convincing, in my claim). For example, imagine that you tell me that a friend of yours is a big New
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York City FC fan, and in response I say “Ah, she’ll be happy after this weekend, then”. If you do
not understand what I’m getting at by making this statement, it is entirely open to me to tell you
that New York City FC defeated their rivals, the New York Red Bulls, in a hard-fought match on
Saturday. Having been given this information, you can then fully understand and agree with me:
“Oh, yes, I imagine she’ll be delighted.” My proposition was previously unsuccessful – you were
not in a position to accept what I was saying as true – but now it is entirely successful – you have
everything you need to accept what I was saying as true. And accepting what I am saying as true
is the full requirement for the success of my speech.
By way of contrast, consider a similar situation in which I say something (that is intended to
be) humorous, instead. So, perhaps you tell me that your friend is a New York City FC fan, and I
say: “Sorry, a ‘fan’? Do you mean a low-level investor in the exciting fiscal opportunities that
come with sporting success in the upwardly-mobile Northeastern soccer market?” Let’s suppose
that this zinger goes over your head, and you do not understand what I am getting at. Certainly, it
is open to me to explain what it is that, had you known it previously, you would laugh at my joke
(granting – and please bear with me here – that in such a situation you would have found it funny
at all): that New York City FC are a recently-incorporated soccer team that sprang up out of a
perceived business opportunity rather than coming about ‘organically’ through accumulated
amateur success; that the team’s press releases tend to refer to business models more than on-pitch
tactics; and that this way of conducting itself has caused some resentment amongst fans of other
teams in the United States and around the world. Now you are in a position to fully understand
what my joke was about; what facts about the world it made reference to. But, because you did not
understand it at the first opportunity, my joke will not be able to meet with success in the way that
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I had initially hoped. It will not be as funny as it would otherwise have been, but for the fact that I
had to explain it. Explanation is, other things being equal, the death of comedy.
For this reason, a lack of shared reference points can rob me, when I speak humorously, of
something I can never get back: the opportunity to have a joke land and be fully appreciated by
my audience. In this limited sense, hermeneutical injustice poses a bigger threat to those who wish
to be understood in the pursuit of comic amusement than to those who wish to be understood in
the pursuit of sincere agreement. This disparity will not always actually come to pass, of course,
since it will not always be possible for someone who is misunderstood due to hermeneutical
injustice to explain themselves and be understood at a later date anyway. When I do not understand
a claim you make, it is not always the case that you can then clarify what you mean and have me
understand you perfectly. Perhaps I am willfully ignorant of what you mean, or perhaps I don’t
care to invest much effort in understanding you. Perhaps it is dangerous for you to tell me that I
have not properly understood you. Perhaps our experiences of the world are so alien to one another
that it will never be possible for me to understand what you are saying, or only possible after an
amount of explanation, on your part, that is prohibitively onerous. 23 So I am certainly not claiming
that, in actual cases, it is always worse to be misunderstood as a result of hermeneutical injustice
when one is being humorous than when one is not. Instead, I am pointing out just one way in which
hermeneutical injustice poses a greater risk to us when we joke: the sense that we cannot, even in
principle, fully recover jokes once they have failed to be understood due to confusion arising from

In fact, this is really why this kind of hermeneutical injustice is a significant form of injustice at all: if
every time hermeneutical injustice caused one to be misunderstood one could simply inform one’s
interlocutor of what she was missing, it would be unlikely to constitute a serious setback to anyone’s
interests.

23
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unequally shared hermeneutical resources, while we can, at least on many occasions, recover nonhumorous speech from that state.

Other Ways in Which Humor Can Interact with Hermeneutical Injustice
But the relationship between humor and hermeneutical injustice is not exhausted by the potential
for members of marginalized groups to suffer comedic credibility deficits. Humor can also be a
tool both for perpetuating, and for overcoming, the unequal distribution of hermeneutical
resources. In some cases it can be difficult to bring attention to the ways in which social dynamics
privilege some parties in the information economy, while disadvantaging others, with a straight
face, but theorists have long noted that humorous modes of communication allow us to ‘get away
with’ speaking important truths that we otherwise could not (Benatar 2014, 34; Willett and Willett
2019, 39-40). Comedy can give voice to under-acknowledged perspectives, and – thanks to its role
as a participatory form, where audiences are invited ‘on a journey’ with performers, and
amusement is linked to some shared experience or understanding – it can make a skeptical
audience sympathize with a poorly-understood joker. Using the kind of comedy Rebecca Krefting
has referred to as “charged humor” (2014, 2) – humor that challenges inequality – jokers can force
their audiences to reckon with strata of social privilege they would otherwise ignore. This can be
a useful strategy in interpersonal conversation, where a humorous mode of communication may
give a speaker a chance to demonstrate her point of view more vividly, and with less cognitive
resistance on the part of her interlocutors, than serious assertion. But charged humor is an even
more potent force when employed by professional stand-up comedians who have a national or
international profile: those joke-tellers have a greater, and broader, cultural influence than the
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average speaker; and, through skill and experience, they are liable to be better at calculating how
exactly to get their point across.
Reginald D. Hunter is a black American stand-up comedian who is based in the United
Kingdom, and whose comedy focuses on, amongst other things, his experiences as a black person
in Britain and his relationship with the British white majority. A recurring theme in his televised
stand-up performances, and in his frequent appearances on the comedy panel shows that are
popular in the country, is the patronizing tone adopted by white Britons in their interactions with
him. He relays anecdotes of pretending to be unfamiliar with popular cultural artifacts, because
“white people get so excited when they think they’re telling you something you don’t know.”
Asked by white comic Bill Bailey if a certain idiom “is racist”, he pointedly draws attention to the
idea that he may be called upon to be the arbiter of racial issues for the rest of the panelists (later
“asking himself” if something he says about white people is racist or not) (Wheeler 2008). One
can imagine that these ideas might not be appreciated by a white British audience, and that Hunter
might not be such a popular figure in British pop culture, if they were delivered in the form of
stern lectures. In relaying his thoughts and experiences in well-crafted comic monologues,
however, Hunter gets his audience to laugh at the way he is treated in the country in which he
lives, and, in so doing, to see that the particular type of ‘othering’ experienced by black Americans
in the United Kingdom is a ridiculous phenomenon.
But comedy can counter hermeneutical injustice without being ‘charged’, in the sense of being
intended to critique marginalization explicitly. As we have seen, much of the force of comedic
hermeneutical injustice rests upon the relative obscurity of marginalized peoples’ accounts of the
world, and humorous speech can itself undercut this obscurity when it is issued by marginalized
speakers. As Chris Kramer (2020b, 28) notes, hearing others speak humorously or playfully will
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often “render concrete [their] lived experience” to us. This is certainly true of the work of Joe
Wong, a comedian who has spent alternate periods of his career in New York and Beijing. Wong’s
routines in China frequently focus on his experiences of living in the United States, with a
countervailing emphasis in his American performances. He is thereby well-placed to exploit the
differences between the two countries for comic effect – but also to introduce his audiences in
either location to sets of cultural expectations they might not otherwise be familiar with. Wong has
felt the process get easier as people familiar with his work begin to understand more about where
he is coming from. Reflecting on the process of turning his experiences into comedy, Wong
reports: “[Previously] I just felt like whatever I’ve gone through was understood by so few people,
because there are very few people who do stand-up comedy in America, and then do it again in
China. I came to China and I was like, ‘Oh, this is a bad decision – why do I put myself through
this?’ But I see the value of going between the U.S. and China now, just because there’s so little
real communication. And I think that comedians are the best people to introduce one culture to
another.” (Dzidzovic and Zhou 2018)
Equally, though, it is easy to imagine instances of comedy that might act in opposition to efforts
to raise consciousness and reduce imbalances in hermeneutical contribution. Let us return to
Carmita Wood’s experience of hermeneutical injustice, and note that what she and others were
initially unable to adequately articulate was a campaign of harassment from an influential
colleague, who, amongst other forms of abuse, would “jiggle his crotch when he stood near her
desk and looked at his mail, or…deliberately brush against her breasts while reaching for some
papers” (Brownmiller 1999, 523). Compare this to the 2004 comedy film Anchorman, in which
the character of Veronica Corningstone, played by Christina Applegate, is the victim of serial
sexual harassment from her colleagues at the network news channel she has recently joined –
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including a scene in which another character brushes against her breasts as he reaches for some
office equipment. The film – set, but not created, in the same decade as Wood’s ordeal – does not
portray Corningstone’s abusers as paragons of virtue, but it certainly plays their harassment for
laughs. Their groping and catcalling is presented as if it is an amusing quirk of Corningstone’s
experience at her new job. And one can see how jokes and comedy might, through a process that
involves comic scenes like these, render a concept such as sexual harassment, whose seriousness
in the popular imagination is hard-won, incoherent or ignorable once again. It is possible that
repeated comic trivialization could repopularize the idea that unwanted sexual advances in the
workplace are merely ‘a bit of a laugh’.
Evidence from psychological and sociological analyses add weight to these fears. In her article
‘Not A Laughing Matter’, Beth Montemurro reflects on Catharine Mackinnon’s condemnation,
decades earlier, of popular fiction that downplayed the seriousness of male characters’ lecherous
overtures towards their female friends and colleagues (Montemurro 2003, 433). Mackinnon had
found that “[t]rivialization of sexual harassment has been a major means through which its
invisibility has been enforced,” and that “humor…has been a major form of that trivialization”
(Mackinnon 1979, 52; cited in Montemurro 2003, 433). Montemurro believes that humor still
plays that role in the 21st Century, with network sitcoms primarily presenting gender and sexual
harassment as if it is a minor office nuisance, or failing to recognize it as a notable occurrence at
all (443).
Elsewhere, the ability of movies, television and print media to affect audiences’ willingness to
tolerate sexual harassment of women is explored in Eileen Zurbriggen’s report of the American
Psychological Association’s taskforce on the sexualization of girls (2007), and summarized in
Susan J. Douglas’ The Rise of Enlightened Sexism (2010, 406). Zurbriggen, in surveying a number
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of studies concerning the link between sexist attitudes and sexualized media (including, but not
limited to, situation comedies on television), concludes that the body of research overall
“suggest[s] that boys exposed to sexualiz[ed] portrayals of girls may be more likely to commit
sexual harassment,” and that “women and men exposed to sexually objectifying images of women
from mainstream media…were found to be significantly more accepting of rape myths, sexual
harassment, sex role stereotypes, interpersonal violence, and adversarial sexual beliefs about
relationships” (33). The report’s findings do not offer empirical evidence specifically about the
possibility of harassment jokes rendering sexual harassment newly unintelligible as a form of
abuse, but, in demonstrating that media can influence agents’ attitudes towards gendered violence,
it certainly shows that Montemurro and Mackinnon’s predictions are in keeping with real-life
observations.

Comedic Hermeneutical Injustice as a Substantial Aspect of Epistemic Injustice
We have seen, then, that unequally distributed hermeneutical resources within a society will help
to determine which members of society can successfully partake in the sharing of humor. We have
also seen that this is a significant enough form of inequality to amount to an injustice. The
conditionality of many forms of humorous interaction means that those whose life experiences
tend to be well-understood by a general audience will have a greater spectrum of references on
which to base broadly popular observations and jokes; and this will have a knock-on effect on who
gets to be considered talented or virtuous when it comes to sharing humor. This is significant,
because humor is both an enjoyable pursuit in its own right, and a social tool that can be used to
gain advantages in other aspects of one’s life. Comedic hermeneutical injustice is unusual among
forms of hermeneutical injustice, given that it requires an imbalance between the knowledge and
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uptake of the victim of injustice and her audience, and because humor is typically not recoverable
after the required uptake does not obtain in the first instance. It also sits within a larger context of
humor’s relationship with matters of social justice, in which it can be seen that comedy can act as
an input, as well as an output, of hermeneutical inequality. In sum, a detriment in the arena of
humor-sharing is among the disadvantages experienced by hermeneutically marginalized persons,
and, given the prevalence of humor in popular culture and interpersonal communication, it should
be reckoned with as a substantial aspect of epistemic injustice. 24

Sections of this chapter have previously appeared in my article “Comedic Hermeneutical Injustice” (Butterfield,
forthcoming).
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Practical Upshots of this Dissertation’s Analysis
During the period in which I have been writing this dissertation, I have frequently been asked to
adjudicate real-life comic controversies. Usually I have had to report, to my own embarrassment,
that my work does not neatly provide for conclusions such as “Yes, she was perfectly permitted to
make that joke, and here’s why,” or “No, Netflix should never have broadcast that, and the reasons
for this are such-and-such.” I fancy that my humor ethics research is relatively applied, as
philosophy goes; but the rights and wrongs of these real-life comedy dilemmas depend on so many
uncertain empirical facts that definitive and specific moral conclusions will, in each case, require
knowledge, or speculation, that go beyond what has been written here. We will need to know, for
example, whether the joker in question was intending to communicate some sincerely-held idea
(making them an impure joker), or was merely intending to be funny (therefore being a pure joker).
We may also have to determine things like the relationship that exists between the joke-teller and
her audience, prior to the joke being told; facts about the social identity of the parties involved;
and how precarious the reputation of the joke’s target is, at the time and place at which the joke
occurs. None of these facts are guaranteed to be obvious to us, when we seek to draw conclusions
about the moral permissibility or impermissibility of the humorous speech act.
Still. In this conclusion, I want to draw attention to some of the world-facing conclusions my
research here has thrown up. The ideas highlighted below are all concrete, applicable prescriptions
about the ethics of humor-sharing, that can help to support, or reject, real claims that one
sometimes hears about normative issues in humor. They are also all things that I did not know,
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prior to the writing of this dissertation; and which I do now. Some of the following are applications
of the logic developed in the body of my dissertation, which are additive to what I have written so
far; others are merely examples of me making conspicuous some of the action-guiding conclusions
I have already drawn.

Jokers Deserve to be Given Some Ethical Leeway
It is not fair to hold joke-tellers to the same ethical standards that we reserve for most speakers
who are not joking. “I’m only joking” does, indeed, function as a moral excuse, at least sometimes.
When we hear someone express some offensive idea (that Irish people are irredeemable drunkards,
say; or that Muslim Americans are intrinsically disloyal to their country), whether she is joking or
not is a morally relevant fact: if she is not joking, we can justifiably conclude that she believes the
offensive idea to be true, and is trying to spread belief in it; if she is joking, it would not be
reasonable to conclude either such thing.
It is because of these facts that we can often get away with saying things, as a joke, that we
would never be able to get away with saying seriously. Friends will permit me to make fun of them
humorously, when straightforwardly saying the same thing would be taken as a tremendous insult.
Comedic political satirists are given leeway to exaggerate the flaws and foibles of their targets,
whereas, if they were straight-laced political pundits commenting earnestly on a state’s leaders or
policies, doing so would count as issuing unfair disinformation in bad faith. This is all perfectly in
order, since humorous speech should not be taken to be straightforwardly reflective of a speaker’s
beliefs and intentions, as non-humorous speech typically is.
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This observation gives us reason to reject certain ethical analyses of cases of joke-telling
straight away. Sometimes – such as when a tabloid newspaper is trying to scandalize its readership
over the content of a comedian’s work – critics will act as if the fact that a speaker was joking is
morally irrelevant. They will report the literal content of the speech without noting that it was said
in jest; or they will point out the logical flaws in a joke’s premises, as would be appropriate if it
had been said entirely seriously; or they will claim that a literal reading of the joke “reveals the
true feelings” of its teller. Moral assessments that include these kinds of claims should be rejected.

Jokers Ought to Accept Responsibility for a Wide Range of Potential Interpretations of
their Speech
If someone you are talking to misunderstands how you feel about the topic of your conversation,
and misinterprets what you are trying to express through your speech, then, under most
circumstances, that’s on them. If such a person acts upon that misunderstanding to their own – or
anyone else’s – detriment, and later come back to you to upbraid you for their misfortune, you can
rightly respond: “I don’t have to apologize, or to justify myself, over this. You interpreted me
incorrectly, and that is your fault. Any consequent action and misadventure are to be explained
and accounted for by you; not by me.”
But when you are speaking humorously, this response will not quite do. It is a consequence of
the ambiguity of humor that others will foreseeably interpret your speech in a variety of ways. One
cannot expect one’s audience to immediately, and reliably, understand how you feel and what you
mean to communicate in joke speech – and as such, it would be unfair to lay the blame for the
behavior of someone who misunderstands your speech at the feet of the misunderstanding agent
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alone. You might say, of your joke, that you “didn’t mean anything (e.g.) racist” by it – and that
may be entirely true. But often, this will not be entirely morally exculpatory. Maybe you didn’t
mean anything objectionable through your comic output; but you are likely to be morally
responsible not only for the correct interpretation of your jokes, but also for a set of foreseeable
misinterpretations.

Cluing One’s Audience in to the Purity of One’s Jokes Can Be Ethically Helpful
Context is important to the moral status of instances of humor – and, in particular, contextual facts
that can demonstrate our pure intentions to our audiences can give us moral space to tell riskier
jokes.
As we have seen, this concept helps to explain why belonging to a particular social group gives
one ethical license to tell contentious jokes about it. This is, by and large, a contextual fact that
we, as joke-tellers, do not have control over. But there are some matters of context that we can
influence. A stand-up comedian may purchase the ability to tell a risqué joke about Jewish people
at the end of their set relatively safely, if, throughout the routine that precedes it, they have gags
that mock religious bigots (or anti-Semites more specifically). Such a presentation is likely to make
it clear to the comic’s audience that they have commendable, non-sectarian epistemic
commitments, and fend off the risk that the later Jewish joke is perceived as a manifestation of
actual bigotry. Those of us who are not professional humorists, meanwhile, may get the chance to
prove our innocent intentions through non-humorous interactions with our audiences. If I poke fun
at women drivers amongst acquaintances, they will be more inclined to give my comedy the benefit
of the doubt (i.e. to interpret it as merely referencing, rather than advocating for the truth of, sexist
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stereotypes) if I have shown myself to be someone who stands up for feminist ideals in serious
conversation and in my personal life.
Note that the claims of this section go further than the idea that admirable people deserve the
benefit of the doubt when they joke, while known partisans do not. That is largely true, but I am
pointing out something additional to this: the fact that agents who demonstrate good behavior will
be interpreted as joking non-maliciously has a direct effect on the permissibility of their jokes.
Because it is less plausible for a well-known egalitarian to be expressing bigoted sentiment than a
well-known racist, she has the ethical liberty to tell jokes that are more racially near-the-knuckle
than her prejudiced counterpart. This is due to the fact that her joke-telling carries a diminished
risk of spreading support for associated prejudices. And this is true even if it happens that both
parties are telling a joke entirely purely, with only the intention to amuse.
It is worth stressing that the contextual clues at play ought to actually convince an audience of
the joke-teller’s pure intentions, however. Simply disclaiming, prior to deploying something like
Cohen’s joke about basketball-playing gang rapists, that you have respect for black men and do
not consider the stereotypes involved to be true, might not be enough to ward off the vicious
ambiguity that can be present in instances of pure joking. Your audience may not be convinced by
your claim – it may suspect, for example, that the disclaimer is something you are issuing to cover
your back, knowing that the expression of racist sentiment carries a social cost, rather than a
reflection of your actual views. And if that is the case, the disclaimer will not prevent members of
the audience from taking you at what they assume is your word, and internalizing a disrespectful
message about black men as a result of hearing your joke. But if you can indicate innocent
intentions to your audience in a way that it is genuinely likely to pick up on, you can carve yourself
some ethical leeway to engage in edgier humor.
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We Have Much More Ethical Liberty When Joking Privately, Amongst Good Friends
Following on from the previous claim, we can say that, when one tells a contentious joke with the
intention merely to amuse, one gains a great deal of moral license to say whatever one likes when
one knows one’s audience very well. We have seen that the potential moral wrongdoing associated
with pure jokers has to do with the possibility of their being interpreted as expressing genuinely
unacceptable views. I noted that this is possible because, when a person jokes, her intentions are
not always clear to her audience. A joker like Jimmy Carr cannot account for what every member
of his audience will internalize as a result of hearing his joke, and therefore he risks the reputation
of Romany Travelers when he jokes at their expense.
Sometimes, though, we can make highly educated guesses about what our audience will think
when it hears our jokes. If I am joking with a small number of very good friends, and we are all
confident that each party has laudable views about the topic we’re joking about, I can be relatively
well assured that the risk of transmitting some ugly idea is minimal. This is because my audience
is small enough for its members to be accounted for, and because I am personally well-positioned
to account for each one of them. I cannot be sure what a million television viewers I have not met
will take from my comedy; but I have a much better chance when it comes to, say, three people
I’ve known for years.

Conclusion
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In sum, then, I believe that the work of my dissertation has yielded a number of observations that
have significant, and immediate, practical import, in the sense that they support conclusions that
can be sloganized as action-guiding advice.
More broadly, though, the most productive output of my work here has involved advancing
the state of the art of theoretical humor ethics. I have explained the need for an ethics of humor to
analyze the comic by focusing on its distinctions from the non-comic. I have observed the
ambiguity inherent in cases of humorous speech, and used this observation to explain why any
account that attributes single, specific beliefs to agents on the basis of their enjoying a joke is
flawed. I have claimed that successful examples of humor tend to sharpen their incongruous
elements by setting them up with manifestly congruous elements – and this tendency then forms
part of my explanation for why we can sometimes read agents’ real views of the world off of what
jokes they tell or find amusing. I have noted the relevance of contextual clues to drawing
conclusions about what a joker means when they joke, and, in turn, linked that relevance to the
ethical benefit-of-the-doubt jokers tend to receive when they make fun of their own groups. My
account of humor ethics distinguishes contentious jokers who aim merely to amuse from those
who actively want to show disrespect: the latter group are not particularly interesting from the
point of view of humor ethics, but criticisms of the former require special moral-philosophical
work to justify. I have provided that justification in the form of the potential accusation of
callousness. Finally, I have shown that hermeneutically marginalized people are liable to suffer a
deficit when it comes to being perceived as funny, and that that deficit equates to a morally
significant harm.
In doing the work described, I take my dissertation to fill in a number of important gaps in the
existing account of humor ethics, and to have pushed ethical discussion of humor forwards, so as
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to allow us to say more about the rights and wrongs of joke-sharing than we could justifiably have
said before. The work herein goes significantly further than the prior philosophical work it builds
on, whilst in all respects being justifiable by appeal to the conclusions about the nature of humor
that I have argued for. To my knowledge this represents the most comprehensive and progressive
treatment of humor ethics yet written, and takes important strides towards a complete
understanding of how those who tell jokes, and those who enjoy them, can be held to account for
the content of the humor they share.
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